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1209 
Generals & General Elections: 
Legal Responses to Partisan 
Endorsements by Retired Military 
Officers 
 
Retired generals and admirals of the U.S. military appear to be 
endorsing partisan political candidates in greater numbers, with more 
visibility. This Note argues that the practice represents a clear danger to 
civilian control over the military and weakens military effectiveness. It 
explains that while retirees remain subject to military jurisdiction, the 
existing array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on political 
activity cannot adequately address the problem. Neither can 
professional norms be expected to shore themselves up to solve it. This 
Note describes how political restrictions on servicemembers have evolved 
over time in response to novel challenges to civilian control. It illustrates 
that retired officers—who receive lifetime pensions and remain subject 
to recall—have always been a part of the civilian-control conversation. 
It also analogizes to judicial ethics, Hatch Act prohibitions, and 
postemployment business ethics restrictions on military retirees, finding 
several compelling state interests that could justify narrowly tailored 
restraints on retiree speech.  
This Note ultimately offers an assortment of potential legal 
responses to the endorsement problem. These include modest changes 
that others have proposed, such as additional disclaimers, restrictions 
on the use of ranks and titles, and rules that would formally ostracize 
endorsers from events and partnerships with the active military. The 
Note also suggests a more radical last-ditch proposal: officers seeking 
promotion to general or admiral would have to agree, as a term of their 
employment contract at the highest ranks, to refrain from endorsing 
partisan candidates for eight years after retirement. Certainly, retired 
flag officer endorsements represent only one symptom of a larger civil-
military divide in the United States. But this symptom deserves further 
study, and not just because of its harmful effects. It serves as a reminder 
that while civilian control may be a fundamental, constitutionally 
derived principle, it relies on measures beyond the Constitution to 
manifest and protect it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Timed to coincide with the “Commander-in-Chief Forum” on 
NBC,1 then-presidential candidate Donald Trump released a list of 
endorsements from eighty-eight retired generals and admirals (“flag 
officers”).2 Not to be outdone, Hillary Clinton released her own list the 
following day with the names of ninety-five former flag officers, 
asserting that this number bested that of any recent Democratic 
presidential nominee and pointing out that Trump had received four 
hundred fewer such endorsements than Mitt Romney in 2012.3 Both the 
Republican and Democratic National Conventions in 2016 featured 
outspoken former generals: Michael Flynn gave a speech and led the 
Republican crowd in chants of “lock her up”—the “her” being Clinton4—
while John Allen “marched” on the Democratic stage and called on 
active servicemembers to vote with him.5  
By most accounts, the number and visibility of these kinds of 
political endorsements from retired flag officers have escalated in the 
past three decades,6 accompanied by an increase in controversy.7 It is 
 
 1. See, e.g., Carrie Dann, 88 Retired Generals and Admirals Endorse Trump, NBC NEWS 
(Sept. 6, 2016, 6:14 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/card/88-retired-generals-admirals-endorse-
trump-n643251 [https://perma.cc/E2XR-2E8E]. 
 2. Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 88 Retired U.S. Generals and 
Admirals Endorse Trump (Sept. 6, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160907051243/ 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/88-retired-u.s.-generals-and-admirals-endorse-
trump [https://perma.cc/Q2VU-RFNW] (archived copy of the Trump campaign website captured on 
Sept. 7, 2016). A copy of the “Open Letter from Military Leaders” can be found at 
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/MILITARY_LETTER.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B8Q-3P6W]. 
 3. Press Release, Hillary for America, Ninety-Five Retired Generals and Admirals Endorse 
Hillary Clinton (Sept. 7, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160908190854/ 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/updates/2016/09/07/ninety-five-retired-generals-and-
admirals-endorse-hillary-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/5ULN-QYY7] (archived copy of the Clinton 
campaign website captured on Sept. 8, 2016). 
 4. Peter Feaver, We Don’t Need Generals to Become Cheerleaders at Political Conventions, 
FOREIGN POL’Y: SHADOW GOV’T (July 29, 2016, 4:32 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/29/we-
dont-need-generals-to-become-cheerleaders-at-political-conventions/ [https://perma.cc/LYM2-
3DXX]. 
 5. Peter Feaver, Controversy Over Military Partisan Cheerleading Continues, FOREIGN 
POL’Y: SHADOW GOV’T (Aug. 2, 2016, 5:51 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/02/controversy-
over-military-partisan-cheerleading-continues/ [https://perma.cc/7NE2-JV25]. 
 6. See Erik L. Christiansen, Curbing the Trend of Retired General/Flag Officer Political 
Endorsements 3 n.6 (Jan. 4, 2017) (unpublished Strategy Research Project), 
http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3407.pdf [https://perma.cc/95WT-H4BA] (reviewing 
the literature identifying the increase in retired flag officer endorsements, listing notable 
endorsements from 1988 to 2012, and noting that endorsement lists increased in number and 
visibility in 2000). 
 7. See Martin Dempsey, Keep Your Politics Private, My Fellow Generals and Admirals, DEF. 
ONE (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/08/keep-your-politics-private-my-
fellow-generals-and-admirals/130404/ [https://perma.cc/X779-TC77] (“From my personal 
experience across several administrations, the commander-in-chief will value our military advice 
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no mystery why candidates consistently seek to leverage support from 
this demographic. The U.S. military enjoys the highest public approval 
rating among government institutions,8 and politicians understand 
that statements from senior officers can significantly affect public 
opinion in other contexts, like approval for a proposed use  
of force abroad.9  
But campaign outlets and the press inevitably refer to retired 
flag officers by their former rank and publish old photos of them in 
uniform, a practice the officers themselves do little to discourage.10 This 
leads to a conflation of their past and present status. As many 
commentators have noted, any influence wielded by these individuals 
 
only if they believe that it is given without political bias or personal agenda.”); Feaver, supra note 
5 (“When Allen demonstrates that he thinks it is acceptable to dismiss criticism ab initio from 
civilians who have not served in combat . . . [h]e is also complicating the jobs of those who have a 
professional obligation to prepare for . . . a Trump presidency . . . .”); Feaver, supra note 4 (arguing 
that retired flag officers have a responsibility not to engage in partisan endorsements); Matthew 
Moten, We Have a Big Problem with Retired Generals Wading into Partisanship, FOREIGN POL’Y: 
BEST DEF. (Sept. 12, 2016, 11:06 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/12/we-have-a-big-
problem-with-retired-generals-wading-into-partisanship/ [https://perma.cc/GE9Z-88H9] (tracing 
the history of the modern endorsement practice and suggesting that it is not only problematic on 
its own, but also makes candidates more comfortable speaking about the military in 
inappropriately partisan terms). But see General Michael Flynn Sounds Off on Generals Allen and 
Dempsey, Khizr Khan, FOX NEWS RADIO (Aug. 1, 2016), https://radio.foxnews.com/2016/08/01/ 
general-michael-flynn-sounds-off-on-generals-allen-and-dempsey-khizr-khan/ [https://perma.cc/ 
G2V3-4KX3] [hereinafter Flynn Radio Interview] (providing transcript of Flynn’s response to 
criticism to his partisan activity); Michael E. O’Hanlon, In Defense of John Allen, BROOKINGS (Aug. 
1, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/08/01/in-defense-of-john-allen/ 
[https://perma.cc/4UDT-CDU7] (arguing that retired flag officers should be able to engage in the 
“national political debate”). 
 8. See Lydia Saad, Military, Small Business, Police Still Stir Most Confidence, GALLUP 
(June 28, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/236243/military-small-business-police-stir-
confidence.aspx [https://perma.cc/9KYF-A8FB] (reporting that seventy-four percent of 
respondents have a “[g]reat deal” of confidence in the military, compared to fifty-four percent in 
the police, thirty-seven percent in the Supreme Court, twenty-nine percent in public schools, 
twenty-two percent in the criminal justice system, and eleven percent in Congress).  
 9. See JIM GOLBY, KYLE DROPP & PETER FEAVER, LISTENING TO THE GENERALS: HOW 
MILITARY ADVICE AFFECTS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE 5 (Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. ed., 
2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Generals-report-updated.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4LH5-HP98] (finding that statements by senior military leaders opposing a 
proposed use of force abroad caused a seven percent decline in overall public support for the action, 
while approving statements caused a three percent increase in public support). 
 10. E.g. Eric Schmitt, Clinton and Trump Each Lay Claim to Military Brass, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/us/politics/clinton-and-trump-each-lay-
claim-to-military-brass.html [https://perma.cc/QV3Y-Z4WR]; Hillary for America (@HFA), 
TWITTER (Sept. 7, 2016, 4:33 PM), https://twitter.com/HFA/status/773665567744126976 
[https://perma.cc/N9C7-89J6]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 22, 2016, 
8:49 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/756697615509688320 [https://perma.cc/ 
6BMD-Z8CJ]. The individuals themselves certainly contribute. For example, Flynn’s twitter 
handle is “@GenFlynn.” General Flynn (@GenFlynn), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/GenFlynn (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T5NV-DCEB].  
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hinges on the credibility of their former institution,11 a credibility 
derived in part from a tradition of nonpartisan service to civilian 
leaders.12 Not only do retired military officer endorsements fail to affect 
how most Americans vote,13 they also appear to erode public trust  
in military leaders.14 
This Note explores the issue of flag officer endorsements in 
presidential elections and recommends that if lesser interventions fail 
to curb the practice, Congress should condition an officer’s promotion to 
flag officer rank upon a promise that she will wait eight years after 
retirement to make an endorsement. Part I summarizes why the United 
 
 11. See Dempsey, supra note 7 (“Their opinion is valued chiefly because it is assumed they 
speak with authority for those who have served in uniform.”); Martin E. Dempsey, Letter to the 
Editor, Military Leaders Do Not Belong at Political Conventions, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/military-leaders-do-not-belong-at-political-
conventions/2016/07/30/0e06fc16-568b-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
XV6P-4T2W] (“[Generals Allen and Flynn] weren’t introduced . . . as ‘John’ and ‘Mike.’ They were 
introduced as generals. As generals, they have an obligation to uphold our apolitical traditions. 
They have just made the task of their successors . . . more complicated.”); Feaver, supra note 4 
(“[T]hey appear to be speaking for the military. They are cloaking themselves in the 
extraordinarily high degree of respect that the American public accords to the uniformed 
military.”). 
 12. See Bryan Bender, Twitter and Facebook are Politicizing the Military, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 
2017, 7:10 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/pentagon-survey-twitter-facebook-
military-politicization-235378 [https://perma.cc/X2U4-UXBS] (quoting researcher who links public 
trust in the military to a perception that it is “above the political fray”); Feaver, supra note 4 
(arguing that “a crucial pillar” of public respect for the military is the belief that it “self-consciously 
and purposefully stands outside of partisan politics”); id. (linking a perception of nonpartisanship 
to higher levels of public esteem and arguing that the “act of wading into partisan politics while 
also pretending to be above partisan politics . . . risks undermining public confidence in [the 
military]”).  
 13. A 2013 YouGov survey asked, “Suppose you were voting in an election and one of the 
candidates has been endorsed by a retired military officer. Would this make you more or less likely 
to vote for the candidate endorsed by the retired military officer?” WARRIORS & CITIZENS: 
AMERICAN VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY CROSSTABS 1, at 40 (Kori N. Schake & Jim Mattis eds., 2016), 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/pages/docs/civ-mil_1_tabs.pdf [https://perma.cc/M64Y-
DZ2T] [hereinafter WARRIORS & CITIZENS]. Sixty-four percent of nearly one thousand respondents 
said it would have “no effect,” and ten percent answered “don’t know.” Id. Only twenty-seven 
percent answered that it would affect their vote in some direction. Id.; see also JAMES GOLBY, KYLE 
DROPP & PETER FEAVER, MILITARY CAMPAIGNS: VETERANS’ ENDORSEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS 10 (Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. ed., 2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/ 
documents/CNAS_MilitaryCampaigns_GolbyDroppFeaver.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FVN-KV99] 
(discussing surveys and concluding, “[A]t the most aggregate level . . . political endorsements from 
military members and veterans do not persuade voters”). 
 14. See Peter Feaver, Do Retired Military Endorsements Boost Support for Candidates—or 
Just Reduce Support for the Military?, FOREIGN POL’Y: SHADOW GOV’T (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:24 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/08/do-retired-military-endorsements-boost-support-for-
candidates-or-just-reduce-support-for-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/89EL-BPUF] (summarizing 
Morning Consult poll from August 2016 that indicated the Flynn and Allen endorsements had no 
clear effect on voting choices but did lead respondents to express decreased confidence in military 
leaders); cf. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 17–18 (finding that military endorsements 
had no significant effect on reported levels of public trust in the military, but did make respondents 
more likely to associate violence, homophobia, or racism with the military). 
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States needs a nonpartisan military establishment. It explains that 
retired flag officer endorsements threaten the constitutional tenet of 
civilian control over the military and weaken military effectiveness. It 
concludes by addressing common defenses of the practice. 
Part II explains the unique legal status of military retirees and 
outlines the existing array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on 
their political activities through a historical lens. Part III explains why 
these restrictions fail to address the flag officer endorsement problem. 
It also describes why shoring up professional norms through the 
exertion of peer and public pressure—the most common purported 
solution to this issue—will continue to fail. Part IV draws analogies to 
other contexts in which restrictions on endorsements have been seen as 
necessary to protect related compelling state interests. It examines 
anti-endorsement provisions as applied to judges and civil servants and 
studies the postemployment ethics rules for military retirees in the 
business context. 
Finally, Part V outlines several potential legal responses, 
evaluating their ability to reduce the number or impact of flag officer 
endorsements, curb parties’ desire to seek them out, and reinforce 
professional norms. For each proposal, it provides a preliminary 
analysis of First Amendment implications. Ultimately, it recommends 
a combination of modest proposals that could help protect the public’s 
current level of trust in the military and foster a healthier relationship 
between elected officials and top military leaders. It also provides a 
sketch of a bolder option that Congress could consider employing in the 
event that the modest proposals fail to adequately  
contain the problem. 
Before proceeding, a few quick words about scope. Retired flag 
officer endorsements represent only one symptom of a larger 
politicization15 problem within the military—one that some scholars 
 
 15. Scholars use the word “politicization” to describe multiple related but distinct concepts in 
reference to the military: (1) an increasing likelihood that members will advocate for political 
positions (of any stripe) or feel entitled to make decisions more appropriately made by political 
leaders, (2) an increasing likelihood that members will sympathize with one particular political 
party or ideology, (3) an increasing likelihood that civilian leaders will employ the military in ways 
that encourage or take advantage of the first two trends, and (4) an increasing likelihood that 
civilian leaders will employ the military in ways the scholar believes are not correct uses for the 
military. In this Note, I explore (1). While outside the scope of this Note, some have suggested that 
(3) and (4) are also problems. See Kori Schake & Jim Mattis, A Great Divergence?, in WARRIORS & 
CITIZENS, supra note 13, (“[P]ressures could . . . cause cynicism about civilians for hiding behind 
the military to avoid taking responsibility for their political choices”); W. Kent Davis, Swords into 
Plowshares: The Dangerous Politicization of the Military in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 61, 68–77 (1998) (describing and criticizing expanded domestic uses of the military). Many 
have also referenced (2) in observing that the officer corps skews conservative, while enlisted 
soldiers have more representative political views. E.g. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 9, at 
9 n.25. See generally JASON K. DEMPSEY, OUR ARMY: SOLDIERS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN CIVIL-
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believe is worsening.16 Certainly servicemembers of all ranks and those 
remaining on active duty are part of this problem. For example, lower-
ranking personnel are the most likely to publicize their political views 
on social media.17 But it makes sense to begin this inquiry by examining 
the behavior of senior officers, because civilians are more likely to 
perceive them as spokespeople for the military as an interest group.18 
And it makes sense to begin with retirees instead of active duty 
personnel, because existing restraints on the active force are both more 
robust and more likely to be enforced, while retiree speech exists in a 
less black-and-white legal landscape.19 
While much of the analysis in this Note might apply with equal 
force to endorsements in congressional or state races, it is limited at 
present to addressing the problem in U.S. presidential elections. The 
overwhelming bulk of flag officer endorsements fall into this category. 
Moreover, presidential elections heighten many of the dangerous 
consequences of partisan endorsements described in Part I because they 
engage a national audience and involve the greatest participation by 
the public.20 Therefore, flag officer endorsements pose the most 
significant threat in this arena. 
 
MILITARY RELATIONS 70–82 (2009) (describing studies that identify the political affiliation of the 
officer corps and enlisted soldiers). However, recent data suggests officers are increasingly less 
likely to identify as Republican. HEIDI A. URBEN, LIKE, COMMENT, RETWEET: THE STATE OF THE 
MILITARY’S NONPARTISAN ETHIC IN THE WORLD OF SOCIAL MEDIA 15 tbl.2 (2017), 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/casestudies/cco_casestudy-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2VF3-ZM75]. 
 16. E.g., Jason Dempsey & Amy Schafer, Is There Trouble Brewing for Civil-Military 
Relations in the U.S.?, WORLD POL. REV. (May 23, 2017), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ 
articles/22222/is-there-trouble-brewing-for-civil-military-relations-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/ 
HC2G-BQBN]; see also Alice Hunt Friend, Military Politicization, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUD. (May 5, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-politicization [https://perma.cc/ 
Q9NM-XYYA] (explaining existing methods of measuring politicization, describing the limitations 
of these methods, and concluding at the very least that “professional standards for ‘citizen-soldiers’ 
have shifted over time from general abstention from any political affiliation to a broad comfort 
with registering with—and consistently voting for—political parties”). 
 17. URBEN, supra note 15, at 24; see also Bender, supra note 12 (summarizing Urben’s data). 
 18. Cf. Dempsey & Schafer, supra note 16 (“[G]eneral [public] ignorance of the diversity of 
political viewpoints among service members has enabled some politicians and retired officers to 
opportunistically capitalize on the armed forces’ [conservative] reputation to advance personal 
political views and ambitions.”). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. Cf. Voter Turnout, MIT ELECTION DATA + SCI. LAB fig.1, https://electionlab.mit.edu/ 
research/voter-turnout (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/AUW6-3XTF] (reporting 
significantly higher turnout rates for “on-year” elections—that is, those including a U.S. 
presidential race—as compared to “off-year” elections, from 1980 to 2016). 
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I. THE DANGER OF “GENERAL” ELECTIONS 
The Supreme Court has called “a politically neutral military 
establishment under civilian control” an “American constitutional 
tradition.”21 Scholars offer different normative theories about the exact 
behaviors that “civilian control” should curtail and disagree about 
exactly how to describe the constitutional allocation of powers over the 
military in furtherance of this goal.22 Rather than engage in these lively 
debates, this Part will sketch out broad areas of agreement regarding 
the importance and utility of a nonpartisan military establishment and 
explain why political endorsements from retired flag officers endanger 
civilian control while also reducing military effectiveness.  
A. The Importance of a Nonpartisan Military Establishment 
The Founders sought to prevent the risk of a military coup, 
presidential abuse of military might, and military adventurism.23 They 
preferred part-time citizen militias over standing armies,24 and while 
they reluctantly authorized the creation of a standing national force, 
they subordinated it to the command of a civilian executive and then 
divided up the other powers necessary to exercise military power 
between the executive and Congress.25 Since 1789, U.S. military officers 
 
 21. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) 
(“The concerns . . . reflect a traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military 
intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our history and found early 
expression, for example, in the . . . constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military.”). 
 22. See, e.g., David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (2008) 
(describing separationist and consolidationist theories of civilian control and advocating for a 
“third way”); John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277 (2009) (advancing a conception 
of civilian control that emphasizes consolidation of power under the executive). 
 23. See Luban, supra note 22, at 531 (“[T]he framers and ratifiers feared a Caesar or a 
Cromwell, wished to limit the president’s power to abuse the standing army, despised military 
adventurism, and feared that a president with formidable war powers might indulge in it.”). 
 24. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 167 (rev. ed. 1981); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(describing standing armies and the “correspondent appendages of military establishments” as 
“institutions which have a tendency to destroy [nations’] civil and political rights”). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16 (enumerating the powers of Congress to declare war, 
raise and support armies, provide for and maintain a navy, “make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation” of these forces, and control state militias when “employed in the Service of the United 
States”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2 (stating that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States” and giving the president power to appoint “Officers of 
the United States” with the Senate’s advice and consent); see Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, 
The Political Balance of Power over the Military: Rethinking the Relationship Between the Armed 
Forces, the President, and Congress, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 553, 561–62 (2007) (describing the 
constitutional division of authority over the military). For an account of the Framers’ efforts to 
divide the military powers among the federal and state governments, and an argument for why 
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have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution—not just the 
commander in chief or Congress.26 The primary concern in the nation’s 
early years was the improper concentration of military power in the 
hands of too few civilians, not the wayward independence of a fledgling 
military establishment.27  
But as conflict became more complex, the management of 
violence required specialists, and the military professionalized.28 A 
much larger, more permanent military establishment needed to be able 
to serve the interests of the state throughout periods of political 
transition. Full-time military professionals inevitably developed 
institutional values and biases as a result of their function within the 
state.29 A different primary risk emerged—that military leaders would 
inappropriately pursue policy preferences inconsistent with the wishes 
of civilians in the executive branch or Congress.30 
Professor Samuel Huntington famously argued that the 
constitutional separation of powers does not adequately constrain the 
modern military establishment and may in fact draw military leaders 
into interbranch political conflicts.31 His solution was what he called 
objective civilian control, the principle of loyalty to professional norms 
and ethics instead of civilian partisan connections.32 He argued that a 
robust, apolitical professional ethic maximizes the military’s ability to 
serve as an effective tool of the state.33  
Modern principal-agent theorists critique and build on 
Huntington’s insights. They envision the ideal military as a faithful 
agent, merely advising on and carrying out the policy preferences of 
civilian principals in the executive or legislative branches but never 
 
the modern military force structure violates these vertical checks, see Robert Leider, Federalism 
and the Military Power of the United States, 73 VAND. L. REV. 989 (2020). 
 26. See Oaths of Enlistment and Oaths of Office, U.S. ARMY CTR. MIL. HIST., 
https://history.army.mil/html/faq/oaths.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QV9L-
HPML] (reproducing text of oaths). 
 27. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 168 (“The Framers’ concept of civilian control was to 
control the uses to which civilians might put military force . . . . Unable to visualize a distinct 
military class, they could not fear such a class.”). 
 28. Id. at 13, 32. 
 29. See id. at 61–70 (deducing a number of values and preferences that likely result from the 
professional role of the military). 
 30. See, e.g., Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United 
States Today, 55 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 9, 33 (2002) (“[I]n the last generation, the American military 
has slipped from conceiving of its primary role as advice to civilians followed by execution of their 
orders, to trying—as something proper, even essential in some situations—to impose its viewpoint 
on policies or decisions.”). 
 31. HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 177. 
 32. Id. at 74, 83. 
 33. Id. at 83. 
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substituting their own.34 While this is the ideal, the reality is that some 
substitution occurs. This can be conceived of as a “spectrum” of shirking 
behaviors;35 as the “relative influence” of military officials over civilian 
counterparts;36 as “bargaining” between the electorate, civilians in 
government, and the military elite;37 or as a “conflictual collaborative 
relationship” marked by a “dialogue of unequals.”38 A related but 
distinct concern involves military leaders leveraging “outsized political 
popularity” with the public to distort the decisionmaking process.39 But 
however articulated, the basic idea is that civilian principals are 
democratically accountable to the electorate, unlike military agents, 
and therefore they should get the ultimate decisionmaking power.40 
While military agents can and must provide expert technical advice, the 
principals enjoy the prerogative to choose “incorrectly” from the 
perspective of military effectiveness.41  
Of course, the line between providing technical advice and 
wading into policy can be difficult to identify.42 This tension is especially 
visible when Congress demands the “honest and unvarnished opinions 
of military leaders” and those opinions happen to diverge from those of 
 
 34. See, e.g., PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 56–58 (2003); see also Kohn, supra note 30, at 9, 33; Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, 
the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 816–17 (2012) (outlining the 
principal-agent model). 
 35. See Kohn, supra note 34, at 16 (listing various ways that the military can “evade,” 
“circumscribe,” and “stymie” civilian authority). 
 36. Id. at 15. 
 37. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, Military Officers: Political Without Partisanship, 
STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Fall 2015, at 88, 95–96. 
 38. See ELIOT A. COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND LEADERSHIP IN 
WARTIME 10, 12 (2003): 
[T]he ultimate domination of the civilian leader is contingent, often fragile, and always 
haunted by his own lack of experience at high command . . . . Civil-military relations 
must thus be a dialogue of unequals and the degree of civilian intervention in military 
matters a question of prudence, not principle, because principle properly opens the 
entire field of military activity to civilian scrutiny and direction. 
 39. Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 841. Sometimes this can occur with the approval or sanction 
of the civilian principals. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian 
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 343–44 (1994). 
 40. Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 802, 816–17. 
 41. See Luban, supra note 22, at 484 (noting that “wrench[ing] the commander in chief power 
out of the hands of the competent professionals (the generals) and put[ting] it into the hands of 
amateurs (the civilians)” could conceivably “impede military effectiveness,” which may be a 
“rational trade-off”); Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 802, 816–17 (noting that as part of the principal-
agent relationship, civilians have the “right to be wrong” (quoting FEAVER, supra note 34, at 57)). 
 42. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 38, at 264 (arguing that Huntington’s theory of objective 
control must be updated to account for “boundaries between political ends and military means” 
that are “more uncertain” than he suggested). 
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civilian executive officials.43 For example, military leaders have 
testified before Congress and contradicted executive branch superiors 
regarding, among other things, the appropriate number of troops in 
combat zones, the desirability of homosexual servicemembers serving 
openly, and the legal protections owed to captured enemy combatants 
in the War on Terror.44  
As these examples suggest, and as many commentators 
acknowledge, top military leaders must be politically savvy to best serve 
their dual political principals, and in some cases it may be that the “best 
military advice cannot be formed without advocating policy.”45 But 
partisanship among military leaders has never been seriously 
defended,46 and the next Section will explore its numerous corrosive 
consequences. Of course, partisanship represents only one element of 
what many believe is a growing crisis in civil-military relations that 
cannot be fully explored in this Note. It bears mentioning, however, that 
what drives much of the current anxiety is the growing power and 
influence of the military’s top flag officers—especially the geographic 
combatant commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.47 
The time is right to dig a little deeper into the postretirement political 
activities of these key leaders. 
B. Flag Officer Endorsements Impede Civilian Control  
and Military Effectiveness 
Whether articulated in Huntingtonian or principal-agent terms, 
retired flag officer endorsements threaten civilian control of the 
military, which in turn can weaken military effectiveness. If civilian 
 
 43. Victor Hansen, Understanding the Role of Military Lawyers in the War on Terror: A 
Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 627 (2009). 
 44. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2286–90. 
 45. J.P. Clark, We Want It, What Is It? Unpacking Civilian Control of the Military, STRATEGY 
BRIDGE (April 4, 2017), https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/4/4/unpacking-civilian-
control-of-the-military [https://perma.cc/ZQF8-GYTY]; see, e.g., Owens, supra note 37, at 88, 97 
(“[O]fficers must understand both the political environment and the policy process and be able to 
participate in debates over policy without becoming swept up in partisan politics.”). 
 46. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 38, at 264 (“Huntington is correct in his contention that such 
partisanship will eventually diminish military proficiency.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Mark Patrick Nevitt, The Operational and Administrative Militaries, 53 GA. L. 
REV. 905, 909, 912–13, 917–18, 925–32 (2019) (explaining the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the geographic combatant commands, and describing how the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
reallocated a huge amount of power to these individuals and “isolated the operational military 
from oversight”); Paul D. Shinkman, The Joint Chiefs’ Power Surge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Sept. 30, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-09-30/how-
joe-dunford-quietly-changed-the-joint-chiefs-role-in-preparing-for-war [https://perma.cc/UP42-
SG85] (arguing that former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford fought for 
and won new responsibilities outside of the office’s role and that civilian DoD staffers “have become 
ostracized from the critical work” that leads to decisionmaking). 
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principals fear generals becoming political enemies after retirement, 
they may be less likely to trust them with the information necessary to 
make decisions that require genuine professional expertise.48 
Alternatively, they may improperly defer to military leaders on policy 
decisions, subordinating the priorities of the electorate to military 
institutional biases or the political preferences of unelected officers. 
Worst yet, principals could select replacements based not on technical 
competence but on perceived political compatibility.49 Continued 
endorsements, especially in the face of controversy, could effectively 
confirm to junior military leaders that the norms have changed and that 
freely broadcasting their own partisan views is acceptable.50 
Subordinates who believe their views are disfavored may lose trust in 
the chain of command, reducing cohesion and unit readiness. 
Increasingly seeing themselves as partisan actors, senior military 
advisors may be more likely to engage in the most evasive shirking 
behaviors, like leaking to the press in an effort to shape decisions on 
force structure or deployments.51  
Finally, members of the American public, after years of seeing 
retired officers trotted across political stages and years of reading 
competing lists of endorsements, may begin to think of the military as 
“just one more pressure group acting to advance its views and interests, 
not the neutral instrument of the state.”52 This could have a self-
fulfilling effect, encouraging those within the force to see their 
 
 48. See Steve Corbett & Michael J. Davidson, The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics, 
PARAMETERS, Winter 2009–2010, at 58, 67–68 (“Civilian political leadership may distrust and fear 
its senior military advisers as possible political threats, impeding a free flow of confidential 
information and candor.”). One anecdote demonstrates how easily this lack of trust could develop. 
Retired Admiral Bill Crowe, who had served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under George 
H.W. Bush, ultimately endorsed Bill Clinton. After losing reelection, Bush told Crowe’s successor, 
Colin Powell, that he “was disappointed,” saying, “Thought I treated him pretty well. Offered to 
let him stay on as chairman for another term.” See Clifford M. Bayne, From Stars to Stumps: How 
Retired Flag Officer Political Endorsements Affect Civil-Military Relations 46–47 (June 1, 2016) 
(unpublished MPhil thesis, Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies) (quoting 
COLIN L. POWELL, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY 561 (1995), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/ 
u2/1030401.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4VG-TGKC]. Had Bush been reelected, it is easy to see how a 
feeling that Crowe had been personally disloyal could have influenced his interactions with 
Crowe’s successors.  
 49. E.g., Corbett & Davidson, supra note 48, at 68. 
 50. Id. at 68–69. Peter Feaver has also pointed out that a “poisonous” effect on the active 
force can occur when endorsers defend their expertise by suggesting an opposing candidate with 
no military experience has no credibility to challenge them. Feaver, supra note 5. Feaver argues 
that this broadcasts to active duty military officers that “it is acceptable to dismiss criticism ab 
initio from civilians who have not served in combat,” when the orders of said civilians must be 
obeyed regardless. Id. 
 51. Bayne, supra note 48, at 23; see also Owens, supra note 37, at 92–93 (summarizing some 
of the most common shirking behaviors). 
 52. Richard H. Kohn, General Elections: The Brass Shouldn’t Do Endorsements, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 19, 2000, at A23. 
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organization in this way; it could also cause a drop in public esteem for 
the military and veterans.53 Low public esteem could hinder 
recruitment,54 especially recruitment from a diverse ideological cross-
section, which would make the military less representative of the entire 
nation and could compound ideological imbalances.55 A skeptical public 
could ultimately elect civilian principals that are more openly hostile to 
the military and less willing to defer to genuine military technical 
expertise.56 In sum, retired flag officer endorsements degrade the 
apolitical professional ethic, threatening Huntington’s Objective 
Civilian Control. They also make the principal-agent relationship 
increasingly toxic and unworkable. These effects, undesirable on their 
own, may also reduce the military’s effectiveness by instilling 
subordinate distrust and tension within the chain of command and 
decreasing the odds that the best professional expertise will be followed.   
C. Evaluating Common Defenses of Flag Officer Endorsements 
Of course, not everyone sees the practice of flag officer 
endorsements as a problem. Endorsers and some like-minded 
academics offer four general defenses of the practice: (1) it helps educate 
the electorate about the national security issues at stake;57 (2) because 
endorsers are no longer on active duty, they should be able to express 
political views like ordinary civilians;58 (3) veterans have frequently run 
for—and won—political office, making mere endorsements relatively 
inconsequential;59 and (4) as long as endorsements go to both major 
 
 53. See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 4 (arguing that the media and the Supreme Court are held 
in low esteem because they are “supposed to stand above partisanship but in fact appear not to,” 
and warning that the military could see a similar effect). 
 54. Bayne, supra note 48, at 26. 
 55. Some argue this already occurs. See Diane H. Mazur, Why Progressives Lost the War When 
They Lost the Draft, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 630 (2003): 
Young people are choosing to join or to avoid the military on the basis of perceived 
ideological compatibility with an institution that has disregarded its constitutional 
obligations to be representative of the society from which it draws its members and to 
maintain its political neutrality with respect to its civilian principals. 
 56. Bayne, supra note 48, at 26. 
 57. See, e.g., O’Hanlon, supra note 7 (arguing that it is better to debate the “vague and murky” 
guidelines surrounding the appropriateness of partisan activities than to “deprive our national 
political debate of the seasoned and reasoned views of some of its finest and most knowledgeable 
citizens”). 
 58. See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 5 (paraphrasing a critique the author had been sent 
regarding the endorser’s First Amendment rights). 
 59. See, e.g., O’Hanlon, supra note 7 (arguing that in criticizing his fellow retired generals for 
endorsing political candidates, Martin Dempsey had “forgotten” Presidents Washington, Grant, 
Eisenhower, and other former generals who have run or considered running for president).  
7_Miller_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  7:18 PM 
1222 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:1209 
parties, there is little chance of harm.60 None of these defenses 
withstand scrutiny. 
The first defense can be stated in principal-agent terms. Retired 
flag officers who choose to endorse are simply providing the “ultimate 
civilian principal”61 (the electorate) with more information about the 
chosen candidate’s national security policies and bona fides.62 The logic 
of this defense breaks down when confronted with the realities of a 
modern presidential election. Campaigns competitively aggregate lists 
of endorsements and pit one seemingly qualified general on television 
opposite another seemingly equally qualified one. Voters may 
understandably conclude that there is no consensus about which 
candidate is “better” on national security and military issues. They may 
reasonably reject endorsement information as unhelpful, especially if it 
is rolled out less to garner support for specific positions and more to 
simply deflect attention away from a candidate’s lack of personal 
military experience or some other security-related “weakness.”63  
Of course, the industrious voter might compare endorsers’ 
resumes and research any offered justifications, especially those of 
endorsers that are more active on the campaign trail. But even 
assuming that voters would accord more weight to the implied views of 
former flag officers than to civilian “experts,” it is at least an open 
question whether they should. Having worn a uniform may mean that 
veterans have a personal stake in political decisions involving the 
military. But unless a veteran also has experience relative to specific 
 
 60. See, e.g., Friend, supra note 16 (“[I]t may seem harmless so long as both major parties 
can marshal officer-advocates . . . .”).  
 61. Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 817 (quoting FEAVER, supra note 34, at 302). 
 62. One can imagine a variant of this defense that argues some kinds of endorsements are 
better than others. Officers endorsing candidates on ideological grounds should be criticized, but 
endorsements based on “institutional” reasons like military spending or veterans’ benefits should 
be considered benign. Presumably, the idea is that military spending and veterans’ benefits 
generally receive bipartisan support, and thus the endorsement appears more “technical” and less 
overtly political. This distinction is too simplistic. As recent moves to provide more private-sector 
medical care to veterans demonstrates, “better on funding” is a position that incorporates many 
implicit political judgments. See Lisa Rein, VA Is Gearing Up for a Massive Shift of Health Care to 
the Private Sector. But Democrats Are Fighting Back., WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/va-is-gearing-up-for-a-massive-reroute-of-health-care-
to-the-private-sector-but-democrats-are-fighting-back/2019/03/21/637f732a-467b-11e9-90f0-
0ccfeec87a61_story.html [https://perma.cc/H4PU-XJ5D] (describing those who believe recent 
Trump Administration regulations will lead to destructive privatization of the Veterans Health 
Administration). Even assuming an endorsement would be communicated in a nuanced way 
instead of simply tallied on a list, voters could easily conflate “better treatment for the troops” with 
support for a candidate’s position on where to send those troops. And endorsers would always be 
able to frame incredibly divisive political issues, such as restrictions on transgender troops, in 
“institutional” terms. That danger is precisely the issue.  
 63. Cf. Kohn, supra note 52 (“[R]etired Joint Chiefs Chairman William Crowe and a handful 
of other retired flag officers endorsed Bill Clinton, defusing his draft dodging as an issue.”). 
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geopolitical issues, her personal stake does not necessarily equate to a 
more credible opinion than those of civilians who have observed and 
studied the same issues from other vantage points.64 Finally, the data 
suggest that even if voters gain information from flag officer 
endorsements, very few of them change their previous support or 
nonsupport for the endorsed candidate.65 If the practice does not even 
help guide voting decisions, then it represents all risk and no reward. 
The second defense argues that these men and women have 
retired, making their actions akin to those of any other civilians wishing 
to exercise political speech.66 As others have recognized, however, these 
endorsements derive authority (and thus appeal) from their invocation 
of institutional experience and expertise.67 No campaign widely 
publicizes the approval of a junior soldier that served one contract and 
then left the military. No candidate seeks the approval of a retired flag 
officer in her capacity as a parent or a homeowner. Rather, candidates 
seek a prominent leader that the public can imagine as a proxy for the 
military writ large. Even if the endorser is careful about disclaiming 
this notion, campaigns certainly embrace it.68  
As a matter of law, these retirees also differ significantly from 
ordinary civilians. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) still 
applies to them, and each branch defines its own membership to include 
them.69 The same concerns about neutrality that motivate restrictions 
on active duty servicemembers already motivate certain modest 
restrictions on the political activities of retirees.70 In sum, while free 
 
 64. See Rosa Brooks, Sorry Folks, Veterans Are Not Necessarily Experts on Foreign Policy, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 8, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/08/veterans-are-not-
necessarily-experts-on-foreign-policy-commander-in-chief-forum-trump-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/ 
NZC6-RE2F] (“A supply sergeant in the Army has a personal stake in whether U.S. troops are 
deployed to Iraq, but this doesn’t make him an expert on the Middle East. The same is true of 
senior officers: Some have valuable strategic insight about geopolitics; others don’t.”). 
 65. WARRIORS & CITIZENS, supra note 13, Crosstabs 1, at 40. 
 66. See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 5. 
 67. Supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 68. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 15 (“Retired senior officers may think they 
are drawing fine distinctions between the formal institution of active-duty military and their own 
views as retired citizens. But the truth is that no one, especially not the campaign team, is very 
interested in their views as private citizens.”). 
 69. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4) (2012) (applying the UCMJ to “[r]etired members of a regular 
component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay”); e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 7075(b)(3) (2012) (“The 
Regular Army includes . . . the retired officers and enlisted members of the Regular Army.”); 10 
U.S.C. § 9075(b)(3) (2012) (“The Regular Air Force includes . . . the retired officers and enlisted 
members of the Regular Air Force.”); see also DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 27–10: MILITARY JUSTICE 
¶ 5–2(b)(3) (May 11, 2016), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ 
r27_10_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5B2-ZZUD] [hereinafter AR 27–10] (“Retirees are subject to 
the UCMJ and may be tried by court-martial for violations . . . that occurred . . . while in a retired 
status.”). 
 70. See infra Part II. 
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speech concerns may dictate the scale of the appropriate remedy, they 
do not explain away the problem of retired flag officer endorsements. 
Where one fundamental constitutional tenet—civilian control—butts 
up against another—free speech—constraints on these individuals 
should at least be up for debate. 
The third defense of the practice asks: Why should we object to 
retired flag officers making endorsements if we would not object to them 
running for office?71 One response is that voters can more directly 
express their approval or disapproval of a candidate’s behavior.72 
Another distinction derives from the public perception of a declared 
candidate compared to an endorser. Those that run for office explicitly 
project an image of themselves as a partisan, with a personal political 
stake in the outcome.73 Endorsers, by contrast, project themselves as 
vessels of decades of nonpartisan experience. For example, Michael 
Flynn defended his involvement with President Trump’s campaign by 
saying, “I feel obligated because of my service to this country,” 
suggesting some kind of professional duty to “help this country” via his 
endorsement.74 Similarly, John Allen justified his support for Hillary 
Clinton by saying he “felt compelled to speak up and be heard.”75 Both 
retired generals pointed to decades of abstention from politics while in 
the active force as a reason for voters to take their endorsements 
seriously.76 In other words, endorsers are “standing on the stage 
wrapped in the mantle of a non-partisan institution but deploying that 
garb for a partisan end.”77 
Finally, some might argue that as long as endorsements go to 
both major parties, there is little chance of harm because the public will 
not associate the military with one particular party. This is 
shortsighted. Members of the public already believe that 
 
 71. See, e.g., O’Hanlon, supra note 7. Huntington addressed a form of this argument while 
laying out his theory of objective civilian control. He analyzed the success of military candidates 
from Washington to Eisenhower and concluded, counterintuitively, that it was “conclusive proof 
that political power and military professionalism are incompatible in the American climate.” 
HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 158. He argued that the “military man qua military man” has 
never been a successful candidate. Id. Rather, Americans favored nonprofessionals in the era of 
amateur citizen-soldiers, “military iconoclast[s],” or else career soldiers able to convey reluctance 
for politics but commitment to serving the entire nation. Id. at 157–62. 
 72. Dempsey, supra note 7; Feaver, supra note 5. 
 73. See Dempsey, supra note 7. 
 74. Flynn Radio Interview, supra note 7. 
 75. Jeff Schogol, Marine Gen. John Allen Has Endorsed Hillary Clinton for President. Here’s 
Why that Matters, MARINE CORPS TIMES (July 25, 2016), https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/ 
2016/07/25/marine-gen-john-allen-has-endorsed-hillary-clinton-for-president-here-s-why-that-
matters/ [https://perma.cc/JG3K-RWCX]. 
 76. Flynn Radio Interview, supra note 7; Schogol, supra note 75.  
 77. Feaver, supra note 5. 
7_Miller_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  7:18 PM 
2020] RETIRED MILITARY OFFICER ENDORSEMENTS 1225 
servicemembers tend to vote Republican,78 even though actual political 
preferences within the force have diversified considerably in recent 
years.79 Many factors likely feed this perception, including the fact that 
with the exception of President Trump, recent Republican candidates 
tended to collect more endorsements from former flag officers.80 But 
even if both major parties could consistently raise equal numbers of 
endorsements, and even if the public would perceive a bipartisan 
equilibrium, this does not erase the politicization problem. Most of the 
consequences described above would still apply—relationships with 
civilian principals could suffer from lack of trust, civilians could select 
advisors based on political compatibility, subordinates with differing 
views could become disenchanted, and so on.81 Endorsements may 
cause harm simply by making active servicemembers more comfortable 
advocating for partisan positions of any stripe. 
In fact, one could argue that any spread across the political 
spectrum magnifies a core problem of retired flag officer endorsements. 
If so many military professionals land on opposite sides, it amplifies the 
perception that there is less of a professional “right answer” to military 
issues. When questions emerge that have less to do with policy 
judgments and more to do with the realities of managing conflict, 
civilian principals may not accord professional advice sufficient 
weight.82 In other words, if civilians no longer think of military leaders 
as nonpartisan experts, will they reject actual expertise when it is most 
relevant, vital, and urgent? 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
OF RETIREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
The preceding Part argued that retired flag officer endorsements 
degrade civilian control over the military and make the military less 
effective at accomplishing its mission. This Part explains the unique 
legal status of retirees within the military justice system. It then 
reviews the existing array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on 
the political activities of active and retired servicemembers, placing 
them in historical context. This discussion demonstrates that the 
United States has a long history of utilizing legal tools to promote 
 
 78. WARRIORS & CITIZENS, supra note 13, Crosstabs 1, at 42. 
 79. URBEN, supra note 15, at 15 tbl.2, 16 tbl.4. 
 80. See Press Release, Hillary for America, supra note 3 (revealing that Mitt Romney received 
hundreds more endorsements than Donald Trump, and, indeed, hundreds more than Hillary 
Clinton). 
 81. See Friend, supra note 16; supra Section II.B. 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 34–41, 45.  
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civilian control over the military and reveals that conceiving of retirees 
as part of the equation is far from novel. Civilian control is a 
fundamental principle derived from the Constitution, but it relies on 
legal measures beyond the Constitution to manifest and protect it.83  
A. How and Why Retired Servicemembers Are  
Subject to Military Jurisdiction  
This Section provides some background on the military justice 
system more generally and then explains military jurisdiction over 
retirees. The Constitution empowers Congress to “make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”84 This 
means that Congress can authorize a system that remains largely 
independent from Article III courts in order to hold servicemembers 
accountable for impermissible conduct.85 It has done so. Structured 
around the authority of (nonlawyer) commanders, the current statutory 
scheme evolved from British customary military law86 and is codified in 
Title X of the U.S. Code as the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(“UCMJ”).87 In part, the UCMJ includes substantive offenses known as 
“punitive articles,” which can be military-specific (think desertion or 
disrespecting a superior officer) or look much like typical civilian 
criminal provisions (think theft, drug possession, and murder).88 The 
UCMJ is also a procedural vehicle, authorizing and describing how to 
 
 83. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Officers and the Civil Office Ban, 93 IND. L.J. 241, 243 
(2018) (“Although we take the principle of civilian control of the military (and military noncontrol 
of civilians) for granted, it turns out that . . . many of its most significant manifestations are 
statutory, not constitutional.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. This allows Congress significant leeway in restricting the 
individual liberties of servicemembers, to include subjecting them to trial by courts-martial, which 
need not provide all of the safeguards afforded to civilian defendants. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 
19 (1957); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879)); see also U.S. CONST. amend V (qualifying the right 
to a grand jury for capital “or otherwise infamous crime[s]” with the words “except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger”). 
 85. See Dan Maurer, Are Military Courts Really Just Like Civilian Criminal Courts?, 
LAWFARE (July 13, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/are-military-courts-really-just-
civilian-criminal-courts [https://perma.cc/67RF-C9SG] (explaining the unique nature of the 
military justice system, highlighting why it was historically “cleanly segregated . . . from its 
civilian cousin,” and questioning the Supreme Court’s recent assertion of appellate jurisdiction 
over it). But see Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2168–69 (2018) (holding that the Supreme 
Court has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the highest appeals court in the military 
system, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces). 
 86. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744–47 (1974) (sketching out the historical roots of the 
military justice system). 
 87. Id. at 751. 
 88. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (2012). 
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enforce (1) the punitive articles, (2) military orders,89 (3) applicable 
punitive regulations,90 and even (4) other noncapital offenses defined by 
federal statute.91  
Levels of process within the military justice system—and the 
kinds of sanctions available at those levels—vary widely. This is in part 
because the “relationship of the Government to members of the 
military . . . is not only that of lawgiver to citizen, but also that of 
employer to employee.”92 On one end of the spectrum, commanders may 
take no action, or they may use “administrative corrective measures” 
like counseling sessions, written reprimands, and transfers.93 In the 
middle of the spectrum, commanders may direct “nonjudicial 
punishment,” which provides limited due process but only exposes the 
servicemember to minor penalties like pay reductions and extra duty.94 
On the spectrum’s other end, commanders may refer servicemembers 
to a court-martial, a trial-like proceeding with the most  
serious potential consequences.95  
Congress has decided to include military retirees within this 
separate legal ecosystem. It has done so by defining the composition of 
each service to include “retired officers and enlisted members”96 and by 
specifying that the UCMJ applies to “[r]etired members of a regular 
component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay.”97 Practically, 
this means that regulations and policies that do not distinguish 
between “retired” and “active” members apply to retired members as 
well, and violators may face enforcement through a UCMJ process. 
Federal statutes that do not distinguish as to status would also apply 
to retired members, and could be enforced through a civilian proceeding 
or via the UCMJ.  
 
 89. Violations of regulations may be charged as a violation of the punitive article “failure to 
obey order or regulation.” 10 U.S.C. § 892. 
 90. 10 U.S.C. § 892. 
 91. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012); see also United States v. Perkins, 47 C.M.R. 259, 263 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1973) (“As a general rule, crimes and offenses not capital, as defined by Federal 
statutes, may be properly tried as offenses under clause (3) of [Punitive] Article 134.”). When 
violations of federal statutes are at issue, the military will often share jurisdiction with other state 
and federal entities. 
 92. Parker, 417 U.S. at 751.  
 93. Maurer, supra note 85; see also Parker, 417 U.S. at 750 (“Forfeiture of pay, reduction in 
rank, and even dismissal from the service bring to mind the law of labor-management relations as 
much as the civilian criminal law.”). 
 94. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2012); Maurer, supra note 85. 
 95. 10 U.S.C. §§ 815-876 (2012). These potential consequences include extended 
incarceration, large rank reductions, dishonorable discharges, and even capital punishment. 10 
U.S.C. § 856. Servicemembers facing nonjudicial punishment may also elect to face a court-martial 
instead. 10 U.S.C. § 815(a). 
 96. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 7075(b)(3) (2012); 10 U.S.C. § 9075(b)(3) (2012). 
 97. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4) (2012). 
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Since the first military pension system in 1878, military and 
Article III courts have affirmed the exercise of military jurisdiction over 
retirees,98 while rejecting military jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers 
generally.99 In 2019, the Supreme Court declined to hear a 
constitutional challenge to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction 
over a retiree.100  
A combination of two theories justifies continued exercise of 
jurisdiction over retired personnel: (1) retirees continue to receive 
government compensation, and (2) retirees may be ordered back to 
active duty at any time.101 The first justification can be traced to 1881, 
when the Supreme Court found a retiree eligible for a statutory pay 
increase, commenting, ostensibly in support of this proposition, that he 
remained subject to court-martial authority.102 Subsequent courts thus 
found a jurisdictional hook via the pension.103 But more recently, in 
Barker v. Kansas, the Court held that retirement benefits should be 
considered “deferred pay for past services,” not “current compensation 
for reduced current services,” at least for the purposes of state tax 
 
 98. See J. Mackey Ives & Michael J. Davidson, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Retirees 
Under Articles 2(4) and 2(6): Time to Lighten Up and Tighten Up?, 175 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 3 n.6, 
4 nn.7–10 (2003) (tracing the inception and confirmation of the idea that “the military” includes 
pensioned military officers, citing, for example, the Supreme Court’s judgment that “[t]he retired 
officer remains a member of the Army” in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 221 (1981)). 
 99. U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (rejecting the extension of military 
jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers as a whole). Ex-servicemembers comprise a much larger group 
than the subsection of those who have attained a retired status, typically after serving twenty or 
more years on active duty. In 2018, there were 2,001,343 military retirees receiving retired pay; 
only 543,121 of those were retired officers. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE 
MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 17 (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/14/ 
2002131753/-1/-1/0/MRS_STATRPT_2018%20V5.PDF [https://perma.cc/A5PJ-DF3S]. The total 
U.S. veteran population that year was over 19 million. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Employment Situation of Veterans — 2018, 2 (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
pdf/vet.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS4L-X7QF]. 
 100. Larrabee v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (mem.) (denial of cert.). The Supreme 
Court has emphasized that the “Constitution . . . condition[s] the proper exercise of court-martial 
jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the military status of the accused,” as defined by 
Congress. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439–40, 450–51 (1987). Congress has defined the 
service components to include those in retired status. Supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
 101. 10 U.S.C. § 688 (2012). This Note limits its analysis to flag officers retired from active 
duty and acknowledges that the justification for jurisdiction may be significantly weaker with 
regard to those who retired after serving their career in a reserve status. See Leider, supra note 
25, at 1071–74 (questioning Congress’s authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over reservists). 
 102. See United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, 244–46 (1881) (holding that a retired 
servicemember should benefit from a statutory increase in pay because he remained subject “to 
the . . . articles of war” (a precursor to the UCMJ) and “a military court-martial[ ] for any breach 
of those rules,” and that “the connection is continued, with a retirement from active service only”). 
 103. See United States v. Dinger, 76 M.J. 552, 555 & n.12 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (“Later 
courts have cited Tyler for the proposition that receipt of retirement pay is one reason Congress 
may constitutionally authorize courts-martial of those in a retired status.”). 
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law.104 The Court has also rejected court-martial jurisdiction over the 
family members of servicemembers stationed abroad, despite the fact 
that these “dependents” receive government benefits.105 Conversely, the 
services have court-martialed members of the Individual Ready 
Reserve in a “nonduty, nonpay status.”106 Therefore, receipt of payment 
“is neither wholly necessary, nor solely sufficient” to explain the 
extension of military jurisdiction to retirees.107  
The nation’s potential need to tap already trained personnel for 
additional service provides a more satisfying explanation than the 
government benefits explanation standing alone. Like members of the 
Individual Ready Reserve, military retirees may be ordered to active 
duty at any time,108 and in recent decades, some have been called up in 
this way.109 As the U.S. Court of Claims has put it, the pension ensures 
a “direct connection” to the military, but the money continues to flow 
“not solely [as a] recompense for past services, but a means devised by 
Congress to assure [retirees’] availability and preparedness  
in future contingencies.”110  
In Part III, the practical difficulties of enforcement will emerge. 
But for now, suffice it to say that retirees hold a unique legal status 
among former government employees. Because they receive a pension 
and could be obligated to return to active service, military retirees 
remain subject to the personal jurisdiction of the military legal system. 
A portion of military law governs their behavior until they die.  
 
 104. 503 U.S. 594, 595 (1992). The Court made clear, however, that “[m]ilitary retirees 
unquestionably remain in the service and are subject to restrictions and recall.” Id. at 599.  
 105. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1957). 
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Nettles, 74 M.J. 289, 290, 292–93 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (involving an 
appellant ordered to active duty from the Individual Ready Reserve—one of the most dormant 
reserve components that does not require drilling or entail pay—so that he could be court-
martialed). 
 107. Dinger, 76 M.J. at 555–56. 
 108. 10 U.S.C. § 688 (2012); see also 10 U.S.C. § 8102 (2012) (providing that “except in time of 
war or national emergency, not more than ten retired flag officers of the Regular Navy may be on 
active duty”). 
 109. See Rebecca Leung, 60 Minutes: Old Soldiers Back on Duty, CBS NEWS (Dec. 3, 2004), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/old-soldiers-back-on-duty-03-12-2004/ [https://perma.cc/2JZK-
DBVV] (interviewing people that had been called to active duty from the Individual Ready Reserve 
and retirement); see also Devon L. Suits, Army Seeks Retired Medical Soldiers to Support COVID-
19 Efforts, U.S. ARMY (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.army.mil/article/234059/army_seeks_retired_ 
medical_soldiers_to_support_covid_19_efforts [https://perma.cc/A28R-V6LM] (describing a call for 
retired personnel to volunteer to return to active duty in response to the COVID-19 pandemic). 
 110. Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1964); see Dinger, 76 M.J. at 554–57 
(reviewing Supreme Court precedent bearing on the exercise of court-martial authority over 
retirees and concluding, “[W]e are firmly convinced that those in a retired status remain ‘members’ 
of the land and Naval forces who may face court-martial”).  
7_Miller_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  7:18 PM 
1230 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:1209 
B. The Evolution of Restrictions on the  
Political Activities of Servicemembers  
The oldest still-existing restrictions on the political activities of 
servicemembers can be found in a series of Civil War–era federal 
criminal statutes outlawing obviously coercive uses of command 
authority to skew election results.111 They prohibit (1) the posting of 
troops at polling places,112 (2) the marching of servicemembers to polling 
places,113 (3) the use of “military authority” to “influence the vote” of 
servicemembers,114 and (4) officer interference with local election 
officials.115 These provisions likely grew out of a concern that officers 
had coerced union soldiers to vote for either Abraham Lincoln or George 
McClellan during the presidential election of 1864.116 If soldiers have 
ever been prosecuted on the basis of these statutes, trial records are not 
readily available; the statutes appear to be rarely, if ever, enforced 
today.117  
Another political restriction dates to 1870 and came about as 
part of Congress’s efforts to downsize the army during 
Reconstruction.118 Congress prohibited army officers from holding “any 
 
 111. The modern versions of these provisions can be traced to a 1909 statute. See sections 22, 
23, 24, 25, and 26 of 35 Stat. 1093 (1909), http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume= 
35&page=1092 [https://perma.cc/A495-UXR5]. These reconsolidated penal provisions were based 
on provisions originally enacted on February 25, 1865 and collected in the 1875 Revised Statutes 
as sections 5528, 5529, 5530, 5531, and 5532. See 1 Rev. Stat. 1077–78 (1875); see also 52 THE 
CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE: THE OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS 1129 (F. & J. Rives, 
Washington, D.C. 1865) (recording that the president had signed a bill “to prevent officers of the 
Army and Navy . . . from interfering in elections in the States”). 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 592 (2012). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 609 (2012). 
 114. 18 U.S.C. § 609. 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 593 (2012). 
 116. See Jonathan W. White, How Lincoln Won the Soldier Vote, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR 
(Nov. 7, 2014, 8:50 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/how-lincoln-won-the-
soldier-vote/ [https://perma.cc/2U4T-9XHJ] (describing the widespread manipulation of soldiers’ 
votes during the 1864 election); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 841–42 (1976) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (“[S]ome officers of the Armed Forces, then in combat, sought to exercise undue 
influence either for President Lincoln or for his opponent, General McClellan, in the election of 
1864.”) 
 117. See Jeremy S. Weber, Political Speech, the Military, and the Age of Viral Communication, 
69 A.F. L. REV. 91, 110 n.108 (2013) (while unaware of the provisions’ provenance prior to 1986, 
noting that “the [anti-interference] statute has rarely—if ever—been used to form the basis of a 
prosecution” and describing cases where it had been “cited tangentially”). It seems most likely that 
if servicemembers were prosecuted based on these provisions, it would have been during the Civil 
War. 
 118. See Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to William P. Tyson, Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys 9 (May 17, 1983) [hereinafter 
Olsen OLC Memo]. Professor Stephen Vladeck obtained this memo through a FOIA request and 
made it available at https://perma.cc/YLM8-KTR6. See Stephen Vladeck, Military Officers and the 
Civil Office Ban, 93 IND. L.J. 241, 245 n.13 (2018). 
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civil office, whether by election or appointment.”119 The Chairman of the 
House Committee on Military Affairs cited the risk that officers would 
increasingly be detailed to civil positions when civilians could not be 
found, leading to the “military grow[ing] to be paramount to the civil, 
instead of the civil being paramount to the military.”120 Senators 
ultimately prevailed in limiting the ban to active duty officers.121 But as 
originally passed by the House, the statute would have applied to 
pensioned retirees as well, since they “were still so much ‘connected 
with’ the military.”122 Typical language from legislators expressed the 
belief that “the military should be separate from and subordinate to the 
civil authority.”123 Debates appeared to assume that the legislation 
would absolutely bar officers from holding any position in the civil 
government—elected or appointed, federal or state—unless another 
statute expressly allowed the practice.124 The ban on civil office 
continued in various forms over the next century and a half. The current 
incarnation prevents active officers from holding partisan elective 
offices, nominative positions that require Senate advice and consent, 
and many other executive positions.125 
A curious, but apparently never-enforced statute dating from 
World War II forbids anyone, whether in the military or not, from 
polling servicemembers about how they voted or how they intend to 
vote.126 Because it only prohibits polling that “requires or implies the 
necessity of an answer,”127 it likely does not apply to standard 
volunteer-based surveys, and these days, there is no shortage of data 
on how servicemembers plan to vote in the lead up to presidential 
elections.128 One can imagine several purposes for such an antipolling 
provision, especially considering its passage coincided with legislation 
 
 119. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 18, 16 Stat. 315, 319. 
 120. Olson OLC Memo, supra note 118, at 10 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 150 
(1970) (statement of Chairman Logan)).  
 121. See 16 Stat. 319. 
 122. Olson OLC Memo, supra note 118, at 10 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1853 
(1970) (statement of Rep. Jones)). 
 123. See id. at 11 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3398 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Thurman)). 
 124. See id. at 10. 
 125. 10 U.S.C. § 973 (2012) (implemented by U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1344.10, POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ¶ 4.1.2.3 (Feb. 19, 2008)). The restriction on 
holding civilian offices first appeared in the U.S.C. in 1956. See 70A Stat. 203 (1956). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 596 (2012). 
 127. 18 U.S.C. § 596. 
 128. E.g., George R. Altman & Leo Shane III, This Poll of the U.S. Military Has Gary Johnson 
Tied with Donald Trump in the Race for President, MILITARY TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), 
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2016/09/21/this-poll-of-the-u-s-military-has-gary-johnson-
tied-with-donald-trump-in-the-race-for-president/ [https://perma.cc/6CEX-6ZZR].  
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encouraging states to change election laws in order to permit absentee 
voting by deployed servicemembers.129 Within the ranks, it ensured 
that leaders could not force subordinates to reveal political preferences 
that could lead to discriminatory treatment and distrust. Perhaps 
Congress also wanted to discourage the newly enfranchised 
servicemembers from conceiving of themselves as a political bloc and 
avoid exposing partisan tendencies within the fighting population to the 
larger public.  
When the Department of Defense (“DoD”) was created following 
World War II, President Truman and Congress vigorously debated how 
to ensure civilian control over a more consolidated, more permanent 
postwar military establishment.130 Some were concerned about the 
extreme popularity of high-ranking veterans and believed that 
centralizing military governance that had previously been dispersed 
among the separate service secretaries would inappropriately empower 
a single person.131 Both the House and Senate bills stipulated that the 
secretary of defense must be a civilian appointee, but the House bill 
went further in specifying that the secretary could not have previously 
served as an active duty officer.132 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) codifies the 
compromise they reached: a waiting period of seven years (originally 
ten years) before a former officer could assume the position.133  
In 1976, the Supreme Court pointed to many of the statutory 
restrictions described above as evidence that the United States has 
historically created laws in pursuit of a “politically neutral military 
establishment under civilian control,” a justification for the Court 
upholding a policy that barred candidates from making speeches and 
distributing campaign literature at Fort Dix.134  
The Civil War anti-interference provisions, the civil office ban, 
the prohibition on polling, and the secretary of defense waiting period 
suggest that Congress has historically found it necessary to enact legal 
constraints on servicemembers when facing novel threats to civilian 
control. The waiting period and the legislative history of the civil office 
 
 129. Donald S. Inbody, Should Soldiers’ Votes Get Counted? That’s Not as Easy as You Think, 
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/11/11/ensuring-soldiers-a-chance-to-vote-was-a-challenge-in-the-civil-war-it-still-is-
today/ [https://perma.cc/CVV7-KVBJ]. 
 130. KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE 
POSITION OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5–7 (2017).  
 131. Id. at 6–7. 
 132. Id. at 8. 
 133. Id. Congress has made two exceptions: first for George Marshall in 1950, id. at 8–11, and 
second for James Mattis in 2017, Exception to Limitation Against Appointment of Persons as 
Secretary of Defense, Pub. L. No. 115-2, 131 Stat. 6 (2017). 
 134. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 & n.12 (1976). 
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ban also suggest that restrictions on retirees—even significant 
restrictions—have always been a part of this conversation. As Professor 
Stephen Vladeck has observed, the survival of the constitutional 
principle of civilian control may depend on these kinds of 
supplementary legal “manifestations.”135  
C. Existing Restrictions on Partisan Endorsements  
Currently, the most salient restrictions on the individual 
political expression of active and retired personnel come from two 
sources: (1) a DoD regulation and (2) a punitive article of the UCMJ.  
1. The Regulatory Prohibition on Implied DoD Endorsements 
DoD Directive 1344.10, titled “Political Activities by Members of 
the Armed Forces,” (“the Political Activity Directive”) prevents active 
military personnel from publicly endorsing partisan candidates.136 But 
its overarching purpose is much broader: to avoid a perception that the 
DoD or any individual service component endorses any particular 
candidate or party.137 In the active duty context, this means prohibiting 
the most conspicuous forms of political activity while preserving 
acceptably private forms of expression. For example, active personnel 
may not author, sign, or publish partisan political writings that solicit 
votes,138 but they may write letters to the editor concerning political 
matters under certain conditions.139 They may not march in political 
parades or perform duties for political groups, but they may become a 
member of a political group and participate as a “mere spectator” when 
not wearing the uniform.140 They may not display a large political sign 
on their vehicles or in front of their on-base housing unit, but they may 
put a bumper sticker on their car.141 They may not fundraise for 
campaigns, but they may contribute themselves.142  
 
 135. See Vladeck, supra note 83, at 243, 251 (“[I]nsofar as these statutes themselves are 
protecting deeper, transcendent constitutional norms, courts ought to be mindful of those norms 
when confronted with questions about these statutes’ meaning and application . . . .”). 
 136. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 1344.10, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
FORCES ¶ 4.1.2.3 (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 1344.10].  
 137. See id. ¶ 4 (“In keeping with the traditional concept that members on active duty should 
not engage in partisan political activity, and that members not on active duty should avoid 
inferences that their political activities imply or appear to imply official sponsorship, approval, or 
endorsement, the following policy shall apply . . . .”). 
 138. Id. ¶ 4.1.2.3. 
 139. Id. ¶ 4.1.1.6. 
 140. Id. ¶¶ 4.1.1.9, 4.1.2.1, 4.1.2.8, 4.1.2.10.  
 141. Id. ¶¶ 4.1.2.11–12. 
 142. Id. ¶¶ 4.1.1.7, 4.1.2.1. 
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This attempt at a balance between individual rights and 
military neutrality can be observed in the Political Activity Directive’s 
restrictions on retired personnel as well, albeit with a much higher 
threshold for what makes a behavior too conspicuous. For example, DoD 
logos cannot be used on political materials.143 Retirees who run for office 
can mention their rank, component, and former title; they can even use 
a military photograph, but it may not be the “primary graphic 
representation” in any material and they must make their retiree 
status clear.144 Should retiree candidates use this kind of military 
information, it “must be accompanied by a prominent and clearly 
displayed disclaimer” refuting the implication of endorsement by the 
DoD or the applicable service component.145 Generally, however, 
retirees may participate in most of the political activities prohibited to 
active servicemembers, subject to a catchall provision that they do not 
“otherwise act in a manner that could reasonably give rise to the 
inference or appearance of official sponsorship, approval, or 
endorsement.”146 Crucially, this prohibits the implication of 
endorsement by the DoD, not endorsements by individuals.147 
2. The UCMJ’s Punitive Article of “Contempt Towards Officials” 
The other legal restriction that bears on political endorsements 
by retirees is the UCMJ punitive article “contempt toward officials.” It 
criminalizes the use of “contemptuous words against the President, the 
Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a 
military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the 
Governor or legislature of any State.”148 It does not specify duty status, 
and thus applies to retirees.149 Prosecutorial guidance issued by the 
executive branch limits the applicability of this provision by requiring 
 
 143. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 5535.12, DOD BRANDING AND TRADEMARK LICENSING 
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION Enclosure 2, ¶ 2.d (Sept. 13, 2013). 
 144. DIRECTIVE 1344.10, supra note 136, ¶¶ 4.3.1.1, 4.3.2.1; see also Andrew Alan Pinson, 
Note, A Bridge Too Far? Directive 1344.10 and the Military’s Inroads on Core Political Speech in 
Campaign Media, 44 GA. L. REV. 837 (2010) (criticizing restrictions on candidates). 
 145. DIRECTIVE 1344.10, supra note 136, ¶ 4.3.1.2. 
 146. Id. ¶ 4.1.4. 
 147. See id. 
 148. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2012). Two other UCMJ punitive articles known as the “general articles” 
have bearing on political speech. These prohibit “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” 
“disorders and neglects to the prejudice of the good order and discipline in the armed forces,” and 
“conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. §§ 933, 934 (2012). These 
offenses would be unlikely to encompass endorsements unless accompanied by extreme additional 
facts, so I do not discuss them here. See generally Weber, supra note 117, at 108 (describing the 
application of the general articles to political speech). 
 149. See 10 U.S.C. § 888; supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’s 
extension of the UCMJ to retired servicemembers). 
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that the speech target officials in their personal capacity in order to be 
chargeable.150 It also prohibits charging those who express contempt 
towards officials not contemporaneously holding the specified offices, 
even if the targeted officials may have held a specified office in the 
past.151 
III. CURRENT LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS  
FAIL TO DETER ENDORSEMENTS 
This Part will explain why none of the legal constraints 
discussed in Part II limit former flag officers from publicly endorsing 
political candidates and why retirees would be unlikely to face 
enforcement in any event. It concludes by arguing that professional 
norms alone are not enough to solve the problem. 
No statutory or regulatory provision constrains the standard 
retired flag officer endorsement. At first glance, the Civil War 
prohibition on officers using “military authority” to “influence the vote” 
of servicemembers would seem to apply.152 The context of the statute 
makes it clear, however, that “authority” refers to the specific order-
giving authority vested in the chain of command, not a general 
credibility that could sway opinions, like the credibility of a former flag 
officer.153 A contempt charge could hypothetically apply in the event 
that a former flag officer uses vitriolic language to denounce an 
incumbent opponent of her preferred candidate. Obviously, this would 
leave most, if not all, of the typical endorsements untouched.  
The catchall provision in the Political Activity Directive comes 
the closest to a limitation. When an officer has reached the highest 
ranks and held the most prestigious leadership roles, her endorsement 
draws on institutional credibility and implies a kind of consensus 
among the military establishment.154 Thus, one could argue that just by 
nature of their unique rank and status, retired flag officers “could 
 
 150. See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES pt. IV-21, ¶ 14(c) (2019), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20 
(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610 [https://perma.cc/22SG-CR58] (“If not 
personally contemptuous, adverse criticism of one of the officials or legislatures named in the 
article in the course of a political discussion, even though emphatically expressed, may not be 
charged as a violation of the article.”). 
 151. See id. (“The official or legislature against whom the words are used must be occupying 
one of the offices or be one of the legislatures named in Article 88 at the time of the offense.”). 
 152. See 18 U.S.C. § 609 (2012). 
 153. The same sentence of the statute prohibiting the use of “military authority” to “influence 
the vote” of servicemembers also specifically outlaws the use of this authority to influence 
servicemembers to vote at all—by “requir[ing]” them to “march to a polling place.” Id. 
 154. See supra notes 11–13, 67–68 and accompanying text (describing the various sources of 
an individual officer’s influence). 
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reasonably give rise to the inference or appearance of official 
sponsorship, approval, or endorsement” by the DoD or a service 
component when they endorse a political candidate.155 Endorsers would 
argue, however, that an inference of DoD endorsement would require 
leveraging more explicitly “official” symbols like logos or uniforms. They 
would cite the example set by hundreds of their predecessors over the 
last few decades as an indication that they acted “reasonably.” 
Even if the restrictions described above could adequately 
constrain retiree endorsements, experience suggests that enforcement 
against retirees would not occur. First, it is worth noting that military 
commanders since Vietnam have exercised “great restraint in 
employing the powerful tools at their disposal” to curtail political 
speech—as they should.156 Active servicemembers have certainly 
violated the Political Activity Directive157 and uttered contemptuous 
speech,158 but courts-martial and nonjudicial punishments have been 
rare, with commanders typically handling the problem via 
administrative correctives like reprimands.159 
Enforcement against retirees, while theoretically possible, 
remains practically unlikely. To levy charges against a retired army 
officer, a commander would need to demonstrate “extraordinary 
circumstances” and obtain a referral from the Criminal Law Division of 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General.160 The other service 
components impose similar policies limiting the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.161 Practically speaking, this means retirees 
almost never face court-martial proceedings, especially not retired flag 
officers.162 The army did not court-martial a retired general until 
 
 155. DIRECTIVE 1344.10, supra note 136, ¶ 4.1.4. 
 156. Weber, supra note 117, at 114. 
 157. See STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OFFICE, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL FAILURE 121–31 (2014), https://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions 
/EncylopediaofEthicalFailures(2014).pdf [https://perma.cc/2HEE-KP6H] (documenting corrective 
actions taken against recent violations of the Political Activity Directive and the Hatch Act). 
 158. See John C. Wigglesworth, Contemptuous Speech Against the President, AIR COMBAT 
COMMAND (Oct. 21, 2010), https://www.acc.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/203584/ 
contemptuous-speech-against-the-president/ [https://perma.cc/9FNW-AHVJ] (describing 
contemptuous speech cases charged under Article 88 and its predecessors). 
 159. See Weber, supra note 117, at 114–19 (explaining trends in the enforcement of restrictions 
on military political speech, including Article 88 and others). 
 160. AR 27–10, supra note 69, ¶ 5–2(a)(3). The same policy provides that “[i]f necessary to 
facilitate courts-martial action, retired Soldiers may be ordered to active duty.” Id. 
 161. Wigglesworth, supra note 158 (observing that, in the air force context, “if not personally 
contemptuous, adverse criticism of one of the officials or legislatures named in the article in the 
course of a political discussion, even though emphatically expressed, may not be charged”). 
 162. See Ives & Davidson, supra note 98, at 16–33 (surveying eight court-martials of retired 
officers, two of flag officer rank, and twelve court-martials of retired enlisted personnel).  
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1998.163 And the army’s 1918 court-martial of a former musician who 
disparaged President Wilson represents the only contemptuous speech 
court-martial against any retiree to date, and it resulted in acquittal.164  
And of course, using a criminal prosecution to handle the 
endorsement problem would be like bringing a tank to a bar fight. No 
one critical of the practice has suggested that a criminal remedy would 
be even remotely appropriate.165 But the way forward with a more 
proportional administrative sanction is unclear. The existing 
framework for postemployment ethical violations can presumably 
handle violations of the Political Activity Directive by retirees, but 
unless the retiree remains a part of the federal government and has a 
new federal supervisor, there is no obvious initiator of administrative 
sanctions, since she does not have a commander unless called back to 
active duty.166 Civilian courts are not a viable option because no specific 
penalties are provided by statutes, as is the case with procurement-
related ethics violations167 or conflicts of interest.168 
Thus, theoretically available restrictions on retired flag officer 
endorsements are either disproportionate, unlikely to be enforced, or 
both. Most commentators assume that professional norms represent the 
only realistic response. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Martin Dempsey asserts that it “is not something that needs to be fixed 
with law, policy, or administrative rule,” and that the solution is simply 
to “say no.”169 Political scientists James Golby, Kyle Dropp, and Peter 
Feaver write, “[W]e are not suggesting the use of any legal coercion to 
stop them,” and instead argue that “senior veterans [should] avoid the 
prominent endorsements that have become increasingly the 
norm . . . as a voluntary measure.”170 They observe that a “taboo might 
already be emerging,” fostered by outspoken former flag officers 
 
 163. Id. at 24–25. 
 164. Id. at 25. 
 165. See infra Part V (cataloguing potential responses to this problem, none of which include 
criminal sanction). 
 166. Cf. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD 5500.07-R, THE JOINT ETHICS REGULATION (JER) ¶¶ 10-100, 10-
200 (2011) [hereinafter JER] (explaining that the UCMJ is the mechanism for sanctioning “current 
DoD employees” and mentioning specific statutes “that regulate the post-Government service 
Federal employment activities of former or retired DoD employees” but not outlining a general 
administrative mechanism applicable to retirees).  
 167. See 41 U.S.C. § 2105 (2012) (outlining administrative, criminal, and civil penalties for 
violations of restrictions on obtaining and disclosing information relating to the federal 
procurement policy). 
 168. See 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2012) (outlining criminal and civil penalties for the offenses of 
bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest). 
 169. Dempsey, supra note 7. 
 170. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 18. 
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decrying the practice in an attempt to exert peer pressure.171 Certainly 
Dempsey is not alone among his peers in broadcasting criticism,172 and 
some retired four-star generals have reportedly tried to encourage 
others to resist appeals from campaigns.173 
Unfortunately, the evidence does not justify optimism that 
professional norms will strengthen themselves without some kind of 
intervention. Endorsers have acted in the face of criticism since the late 
1980s, when the modern form of the practice began.174 And yet this has 
not prevented the onslaught of former flag officers signing onto 
endorsement letters and accepting public roles in campaigns.175 In fact, 
some, like Hillary Clinton supporter General John Allen, actually lean 
on the norm to posture themselves as followers of conscience that 
simply cannot stay quiet due to an unprecedented sense of “crisis.”176 
What prevents endorsers from arguing that every election represents 
such a crisis?  
The same reasons motivating past legal interventions and 
current restrictions on the political activity of active and retired 
servicemembers should motivate a novel legal response to the current 
problem of retired flag officer endorsements. Unique among former 
government workers, those receiving a military pension remain under 
the jurisdiction of their former institution, and a major theme of the 
Political Activity Directive acknowledges that the public perception of 
retirees can negatively impact the military’s ability to remain apolitical. 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Molly O’Toole, Ex-General to Top Brass: Stay Out of the ‘Cesspool of Domestic 
Politics’, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 11, 2016, 7:53 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/11/ex-general-
to-top-brass-stay-out-of-the-cesspool-of-domestic-politics/ [https://perma.cc/D7HC-V6PU] 
(recalling an interview with John Kelly, a retired marine general (and future white house chief of 
staff), who argued that the practice increases “mistrust” and that an endorsement “just becomes a 
talking point on CNN” without convincing any voters); Dana Priest & Greg Miller, He Was One of 
the Most Respected Intel Officers of His Generation. Now He’s Leading ‘Lock Her Up’ Chants, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-the-entire-
national-security-establishment-has-rejected-trumpexcept-for-this-man/2016/08/15/d5072d96-
5e4b-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78_story.html [https://perma.cc/3XVN-729U] (quoting a statement 
from Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen criticizing Flynn and Allen for 
their “disappointing lack of judgment in [speaking out] for crass partisan purposes”). 
 173. Feaver, supra note 4. 
 174. For a historical example, see David Evans, Bush Ad Becomes a Political Minefield for a 
Retired Marine, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 1992), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-03-
13-9201230646-story.html [https://perma.cc/A84G-CJ2J]. 
 175. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (providing examples of endorsements from 
the 2016 presidential campaign). 
 176. See Priest & Miller, supra note 172 (quoting Allen as acknowledging that “[r]etired senior 
officers should not take lightly the impact of public commentary in a political environment” but 
asserting that Trump would “create a civil-military crisis,” prompting him to speak out as a 
“matter of conscience”). 
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The current legal framework cannot effectively address the 
endorsement problem, but neither can existing professional norms. 
IV. ANTI-ENDORSEMENT LESSONS FROM OTHER CONTEXTS 
In two nonmilitary contexts and one military but nonpolitical 
context, the government restricts individuals from making or implying 
endorsements. This Part first analogizes to codes of judicial ethics and 
restrictions on civil servants. It then describes how military retirees 
may not use rank or title to imply DoD endorsement of a private 
business, and how they may not immediately attempt to influence the 
official action of their former service component on behalf of a private 
organization. Each of these examples offers lessons about how to design, 
enforce, and justify provisions intended to deter or reduce the impact of 
retired flag officer endorsements. 
A. Judges 
The U.S. legal profession began attempting to regulate judicial 
ethics in the early twentieth century.177 Today, the vast majority of 
federal judges178 must adhere to Canon 5 of the Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges, which enumerates a prohibition against “publicly 
endors[ing] or oppos[ing] a candidate for public office.”179 The American 
Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which forms 
the basis for most judicial ethics rules at the state level,180 contains a 
nearly identical prohibition in Rule 4.1(A)(3).181 Significantly, the 
federal anti-endorsement provision applies to judges who have retired 
due to disability, retired into senior status, or retired but remain subject 
 
 177. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial 
Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 314–15 
(2003) (“The American Bar Association made its first attempt at promulgating rules of judicial 
conduct in 1924.”). 
 178. By this I mean essentially all Article III judges (but not the Supreme Court Justices) and 
many Article I judges, including those on the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces. U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 1–2 
(2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_ 
effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF9Y-7VD9]. 
 179. Id. at 18–19.  
 180. See Model Code Anniversary, JUD. ETHICS & DISCIPLINE (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/category/new-codes-of-judicial-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/THS9-
EYTL] (noting that “[m]ost states adopted the 1972 model code almost verbatim” and “30 
jurisdictions have adopted new codes . . . that include many . . . 2007 model code revisions”). 
 181. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1(A)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (stating that a 
judge shall not “publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office”). 
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to recall.182 Similarly, a retired judge “subject to recall for service, who 
by law is not permitted to practice law” remains subject to the ABA anti-
endorsement provision.183 Potential sanctions span from public 
reprimand to removal.184 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld 
Minnesota’s anti-endorsement provision in 2012 under strict scrutiny, 
observing that even without actual bias against litigants, “the act of 
endorsement itself undermines the judiciary’s appearance of 
impartiality because the public may perceive the judge to be beholden 
to political interests.”185 In 2010, the Seventh Circuit upheld 
Wisconsin’s endorsement prohibition, though it arrived at that 
conclusion by applying a balancing approach for government employee 
speech.186 Like the Eighth Circuit, it found the risk of “undermin[ing] 
the appearance of impartiality” significant.187 The court also found that 
“the constitutional protection in a political endorsement is tempered by 
the limited communicative value of such an endorsement.”188 In other 
words, mere endorsements do little to broadcast the qualifications and 
beliefs of a judge who is herself campaigning for office, which the 
Supreme Court has found worthy of protecting.189 Instead, they mainly 
boost the endorsee and suggest “an effort to . . . assume a role as 
political powerbroker.”190  
The Supreme Court has not considered judicial endorsements, 
but in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, it upheld a restriction on judicial 
candidates personally soliciting campaign contributions.191 The Court 
 
 182. Senior judges are those who have met age and service requirements, meet yearly 
workload requirements (roughly the amount that an active service judge completes in three 
months), and remain salaried. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (2012). A judge “permanently disabled from 
performing his duties” may fully retire from active service under 28 U.S.C. § 372(a). These judges, 
along with “[a]ll other retired judges who are eligible for recall to judicial service (except those in 
U.S. territories and possessions)” should comply with the entirety of the Code of Conduct except 
some of the sections of Canon 4—meaning Canon 5 continues to apply. See CODE OF CONDUCT, 
supra note 178, at 19–20. 
 183. See Application, AM. BAR ASS’N (2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/professional_responsibility/2011_mcjc_application.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB7S-
NS4L] (explaining in Part II that retired judges fitting this description need not comply with Rules 
3.9 or 3.8(A), meaning Rule 4 continues to apply). 
 184. MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
 185. Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1025 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 186. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983–88 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 187. Id. at 986. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 984 (noting the “distance between an endorsement and speech about a judge’s 
own campaign”); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding 
that a canon prohibiting candidates for judicial office from announcing their views violated the 
First Amendment). 
 190. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984. 
 191. 575 U.S. 433, 437 (2015). 
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emphasized that preserving public trust in the judiciary’s ability to 
administer justice was a compelling state interest.192 “[T]he role of 
judges differs from the role of politicians,” and even though judges may 
successfully avoid favoring donors, the mere perception of favorable 
treatment would erode public confidence, justifying intervention.193 
Certainly a comparison between military officers and judges 
should not be taken too far, because anti-endorsement rules as applied 
to retired judges do not appear to have been tested in the courts, and 
there are separate, additional imperatives for maintaining judicial 
impartiality tied up in the due process rights of litigants.194 But the 
drafters of the judicial codes of conduct understood that retired, 
pensioned judges subject to recall maintain the ability to harm public 
trust in the judiciary’s neutrality. Likewise, retired, pensioned military 
officers—who are also subject to recall—maintain the ability to harm 
public trust in the military’s neutrality. Just as judges must appear to 
be impartial in order to dispense justice effectively, the military must 
appear to be apolitical in order to serve the state effectively.195 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s skepticism regarding the 
communicative value of mere endorsements applies with equal force in 
the military context. A flag officer adding her name and rank to a 
candidate’s list of endorsements, without more, does little to educate 
the voting public about the candidate’s merits or the issues at stake. 
But it does broadcast the flag officer’s desire to be a “political 
powerbroker.”196 
B. Civil Servants 
Like judges, civil servants must temper their individual speech 
in the service of an institution meant to be nonpartisan. In 1939, 
Congress passed the Hatch Act, which subjected federal public 
employees (and some state employees) to a wide array of restrictions on 
partisan activities and which remains in force today, albeit somewhat 
narrowed.197 Today, employees in agencies considered more sensitive—
 
 192. Id. at 444–48. 
 193. Id. at 446.  
 194. See, e.g., Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984–85 (“[U]nlike restrictions designed, for example, to 
regulate federal employees’ political activity, restrictions on judicial speech may, in some 
circumstances, be required by the Due Process Clause.”). 
 195. See supra Sections I.A, I.B. 
 196. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984. 
 197. See Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (2012). The Hatch Act actually built on over fifty 
years of rule development regarding the active participation of federal employees in political 
campaigns. See Scott J. Bloch, The Judgment of History: Faction, Political Machines, and the Hatch 
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like the Federal Election Commission, the National Security Council, 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency—violate regulations implemented 
under the Hatch Act if they “[e]ndorse or oppose a candidate for 
partisan political office” in campaign materials “in concert” with the 
campaign.198 Additionally, all employees, even those in less restricted 
agencies, cannot use their “official authority or influence” to influence 
an election by, for example, using their official titles or positions while 
working with a campaign.199 The Office of the Special Counsel (“OSC”) 
investigates Hatch Act violations, issues warning letters and legal 
opinions, and brings cases in front of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection 
Board.200 Sanctions include reprimands, grade reductions, fines up to 
$1,000, suspension, removal, and temporarily banning individuals from 
federal employment.201 
Hatch Act restrictions have survived multiple constitutional 
challenges at the Supreme Court.202 The Court has cited several 
government interests at play. These include selecting civil servants 
based on merit instead of political connections; enforcing the laws “in 
accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with 
their own or the will of a political party”; preventing leaders from 
coercing subordinates to vote for or support particular parties; and 
avoiding erosion of public trust in representative government.203 As 
discussed above, deterring retired flag officer endorsements would 
similarly discourage the selection of officers for senior military positions 
 
Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 225, 230–36 (2005) (describing how the 1883 Pendleton Act marked 
the end of the spoils system and tracing the substantive evolution of Hatch Act provisions). 
 198. 5 C.F.R. § 734.411(d) (2019). 
 199. 5 C.F.R. § 734.302(a), (b)(1) (2019). 
 200. See Your Role in an OSC Investigation, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS. 1 (2018), 
https://osc.gov/Documents/PPP/Processing%20Complaints%20of%20PPPs/Your%20Role%20in%2
0an%20OSC%20Investigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LK7-7GAV]. 
 201. See Eileen Ambrose, Campaign Rules for Federal Employees Get an Update, BALT. SUN 
(Jan. 27, 2013, 9:55 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/bs-md-federal-hatch-
20130127-story.html [https://perma.cc/3S2J-WYFJ] (summarizing the new “menu” of penalties 
available after the Hatch Act Modernization Act passed in 2013). 
 202. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 
(1973) (holding that various Hatch Act restrictions were not unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 78–82 (1947) (holding that 
Congress had the power to enact the Hatch Act and affirming termination of a public employee 
who had served as a poll watcher and a paymaster for party workers). 
 203. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 413 U.S. at 564–65. The Court cited a related rationale when it 
upheld mandatory disclosure requirements for lobbyists in United States v. Harriss. 347 U.S. 612 
(1954). To refuse would be to “deny Congress in large measure the power of self-protection,” it 
observed, by allowing the “voice of special interest groups” to drown out that of the people. Id. at 
625. Since the nation’s founding, civilian control of the military has been understood as 
governmental self-preservation. Instead of a coup, the modern threat is the risk that military 
leaders will prioritize their own interests over those of their civilian principals. See discussion 
supra notes 34–41. 
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based on political compatibility, strengthen the hands of civilians in 
Congress and the executive branch over their military agents, avoid 
potential corrosive effects when subordinates perceive themselves to 
have disfavored political views, and fortify public trust in the 
military.204   
C. Business Ethics 
Retired flag officers face a number of restrictions on their 
employment activities beyond those that all officers must comply with 
once they leave the service.205 For example, while retired officers enjoy 
a broader privilege to use their previous rank and title than other 
former servicemembers,206 DoD ethics regulations prohibit them from 
using their military titles in the context of employment and business 
dealings if doing so “in any way casts discredit on DoD or gives the 
appearance of sponsorship, sanction, endorsement, or approval by 
DoD.”207 Additionally, the more stringent “revolving door” prohibitions 
for federal employees apply to retired flag officers—namely, they face 
the prospect of criminal prosecution if they communicate with 
employees of their former service component for the purpose of 
influencing its official action.208 This “cooling-off” period applies even if 
the retired flag officer was not “personally or substantially” involved in 
the matter at hand.209 But it does not prevent retirees from giving 
companies “behind-the-scenes” assistance.210 These observations 
suggest that the statute primarily aims to temper the perception that 
 
 204. See supra Section I.B. 
 205. All separated officers face criminal liability if they perform certain activities for 
nonfederal employers. See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). For example, they may never attempt to 
influence the government regarding a specific party on a particular matter that they worked on 
personally and substantially when employed by the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 
Regarding matters they did not personally work on but should have known were pending under 
their responsibility during their last year of service, separated officers may not attempt to work 
on those matters for another party for two years. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2).  
 206. See 10 U.S.C. § 772 (2012) (authorizing “retired officer[s] of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
or Marine Corps” to “bear the title . . . of [their] retired grade[s]” but not affording the same 
privilege to nonretired officers or enlisted personnel unless they “served honorably in time of war”). 
 207. See JER, supra note 166, ¶ 2-304 (stipulating when retired military members “may use 
military titles in connection with commercial enterprises”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702(b) (2019) 
(explaining permissible usage of government positions and titles for executive branch employees).  
 208. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(1) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(2)(iv) (explaining that the 
prohibition applies to those previously employed in the O-7 (flag officer) pay grade). 
 209. Pre- and Post- Employment Restrictions for Separating and Retiring Air Force Personnel, 
DEP’T OF THE A.F. GEN. COUNS. 13 (2016), https://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/Portals/80/documents/ 
gca/ethics/AFD-160727-002.pdf?ver=2016-08-18-110459-677 [https://perma.cc/3LDG-GVDU]. 
 210. Id. at 7.  
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retirees will use their influence to improperly benefit contractors or 
lobbyists.211  
Thus, regulatory and statutory business ethics restrictions on 
retired flag officers reflect the logical understanding that these officers, 
due to their high rank and visibility, are more likely to mistakenly 
suggest that their former employer “endorses” a project or favors an 
interest group. They are also more likely to generate public distrust in 
government should they immediately cozy up to private entities that 
stand to make a lot of money from the military. The same logic applies 
in the political endorsement context. By nature of their high rank and 
visibility, retired flag officers are more in danger of implying an 
endorsement by their former institution, and their overt acts of 
partisanship are more likely to degrade the public’s perception of a 
politically neutral military.  
V. POTENTIAL LEGAL RESPONSES  
So far, this Note has summarized why the United States 
requires an apolitical military, one subject to robust civilian control. It 
has argued that the practice of retired flag officers endorsing partisan 
political candidates appears to be worsening, represents a clear danger 
to civilian control, and weakens military effectiveness. It has explained 
that while retirees remain subject to military jurisdiction, the existing 
array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on political activity 
cannot adequately address the problem, and neither can professional 
norms. Finally, it has analogized to judicial ethics, Hatch Act 
prohibitions, and postemployment business ethics restrictions on 
retired flag officers. Now this Note turns to potential legal responses. 
This Part first outlines some general concerns: namely, how to 
define “endorsement” and why any response would need to be framed 
around the endorser, not the campaign or the candidate. It attempts to 
situate the flag officer endorsement problem within some of the 
Supreme Court’s highly deferential decisions involving speech that 
could degrade military discipline and efficacy. The remaining Sections 
explain and evaluate four potential legal responses.  
First, the DoD and each service component could enact new rules 
that would punish endorsers by blocking them from participating in 
events and partnerships sponsored by that component.212 Second, the 
DoD could update the Political Activity Directive to mandate that 
should a retired flag officer make a partisan endorsement, she must 
 
 211. See id. at 13 (describing the purpose of the “cooling-off” period). 
 212. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 20. 
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simultaneously provide a series of strongly worded disclaimers. Third, 
the DoD could update ethics regulations to prohibit the use of titles and 
rank in conjunction with partisan endorsements.213 The disclaimer and 
military title proposals would ideally be backed up by Congress giving 
the OSC (or an entity within the DoD) clear statutory authority to refer 
cases to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board to conduct informal 
adjudications with the ability to impose civil penalties.  
The most legally justifiable solution would likely be some 
combination of these three responses. While somewhat harder to justify 
under the First Amendment, a fourth response is worth discussing: a 
contractual promise that should officers be selected for promotion to 
flag officer rank, they will refrain from endorsing any candidate for 
partisan office for eight years after retirement. 
A. Defining “Endorsement” and Targeting the Supply, Not the Demand 
Endorsements represent political speech at the core of the First 
Amendment’s protection.214 Of course, the majority of the retired flag 
officers who engage in the practice do so by simply allowing a campaign 
to publish their name and rank.215 Mere endorsements, without more, 
have “limited communicative value” regarding the qualifications and 
beliefs of the candidate, as the Seventh Circuit observed in the context 
of judicial elections.216 The data available bears this out insomuch as 
retired flag officer endorsements fail to affect voters’ decisionmaking.217 
But what is a mere endorsement? 
No matter the legal response chosen, defining “endorsement” 
without violating the First Amendment would represent a significant 
challenge. The definition needs to be expansive enough to prevent 
simple workarounds but limited enough to avoid precluding meaningful 
debate on issues. When considering a cap on how much individuals 
could spend “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” the Supreme 
Court avoided unconstitutional vagueness by interpreting the cap to be 
“limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of 
 
 213. Cf. Corbett & Davidson, supra note 48, at 70 (“In the near-term, the most effective 
restraint on political endorsements is the military itself.”). 
 214. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at the 
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’ ” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion))). 
 215. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 1–3 (describing flag officer endorsements 
during the 2016 presidential campaign). 
 216. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 986 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 217. See sources cited supra notes 13–14, 65. 
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election or defeat of a candidate.”218 This language, focusing on 
connection to a named candidate instead of policies associated with 
those candidates, would be a good place to start in crafting a definition 
of partisan endorsement aimed at deterring flag officers. 
In terms of overall design, any legal response would have to 
target the supply of the endorsements, not the demand. It would be 
tempting to directly address the role that campaigns play in competing 
to collect endorsements from former military leaders. But restricting 
campaigns from soliciting endorsements or spending campaign money 
on content featuring retired flag officers would stand on much shakier 
constitutional footing. Putting aside the rights of the officers, these 
options would certainly violate the candidates’ free speech and free 
association rights. The Supreme Court has made clear that in the 
context of congressional and executive elections, “[t]he candidate, no 
less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in 
the discussion of public issues and [to] vigorously and 
tirelessly . . . advocate his own election.”219 
 Soliciting and using campaign funds represents a form of 
protected speech, and limitations beyond certain disclosure 
requirements are frequently invalidated.220 The Court already looks 
skeptically at quantitative expenditure limitations,221 suggesting that a 
content-based expenditure limitation would be even less likely to 
survive strict scrutiny. Restricting candidates from soliciting retiree 
endorsements would also fail to achieve the intended effect. Political 
action committees (“PACs”) and other supporters would quickly step in 
to solicit and publicize these endorsements, sidestepping restrictions on 
 
 218. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7, 43 (1976) (per curiam). Of course, the Court went on to 
find that the $1,000 expenditure cap violated the First Amendment, id. at 44–51, but its analysis 
does not transfer easily to the proposals outlined in this Section. The cap applied to “all citizens 
and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press,” id. at 19 (emphasis 
added), and implicated different state interests, see id. at 45–51 (rejecting “equalizing the relative 
ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” as a compelling state 
interest and explaining why the spending cap was inadequately tailored to “prevent[ ] corruption 
and the appearance of corruption”).  
 219. Id. at 52. The Court has distinguished elections for judicial office. See Williams-Yulee v. 
Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446, 1662 (2015); supra Section IV.A (surveying anti-endorsement rules 
governing judges). 
 220. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (holding that 
expenditure thresholds for self-financed congressional candidates constitute a facial violation of 
the First Amendment); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57–58, 61 (invalidating limitations on campaign 
expenditures but finding that disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 did not violate the Constitution when narrowly construed). See generally FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAWS (2019), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-
content/documents/feca.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWU8-HMY5] (collecting and outlining federal law 
on campaign finance and disclosure requirements). 
 221. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s statutory 
limitation on the amount candidates for state office could expend).  
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the campaigns themselves.222 PACs may currently make unlimited 
election-related expenditures as long as they do so without consulting 
or cooperating with a candidate or a candidate’s agent.223 Practically 
speaking, a campaign-centric approach would also be hard to enforce. 
While the evidence that a retired flag officer made an endorsement 
exists in the public domain, evidence of endorsement solicitation by 
campaign proxies would be nonobvious and purposefully obscured. 
Restrictions on retired flag officers themselves would obviously 
also need to withstand scrutiny commensurate to the form such 
restrictions take, which the following Sections will explore. But these 
restrictions could draw on a number of rationales unavailable to 
restrictions on campaigns or candidates. First, as pensioned personnel 
that face the possibility of being recalled to service, retired flag officers 
continue to belong to their service components and continue to fall 
under UCMJ jurisdiction.224 Many of the motivations behind political 
activity restrictions on active servicemembers—the validity of which 
has never been seriously challenged—apply with equal force to retired 
flag officers.225 And while the DoD does not currently employ retired 
flag officers, it still regulates their conduct to some extent because they 
present much of the same risk of mistakenly implying an institutional 
endorsement.226 A reviewing court might therefore choose to apply more 
deferential balancing approaches to the First Amendment based on the 
 
 222. Ease of solicitation by proxy likewise dooms the suggestion by Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 
that political parties might conclude “that the costs of the military endorsements exceed the 
benefits,” leading to self-regulation. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 20. They write: 
“The campaigns could agree not to give senior military officers or veterans speaking roles at 
conventions or in advertisements, negotiating the terms much as they negotiate the rules 
surrounding the presidential debates.” Id. 
 223. See Making Independent Expenditures, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/ 
help-candidates-and-committees/making-independent-expenditures/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/8RHF-82NV] (“Individuals, groups, corporations, labor organizations and 
political committees . . . may support or oppose candidates by making independent 
expenditures . . . [which] are not contributions and are not subject to limits.”); id. (clarifying that 
an “independent expenditure . . . [i]s not made in consultation or cooperation with, or at the 
request or suggestion of any candidate, or his or her authorized committees or agents, or a political 
party committee or its agents”); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
372 (2010) (finding that corporate expenditures on electioneering communications constitute 
protected speech).  
 224. See discussion supra notes 96–110 (discussing the continued exercise of military 
jurisdiction over retired servicemembers). 
 225. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
 226. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 154–155, Sections II.C.2, IV.B. 
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idea that retired officer speech is like government employee speech227 
or, more importantly, like the speech of active servicemembers.228  
The Supreme Court observed in Parker v. Levy that “the military 
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society,” and 
that “the different character of the military community and of the 
military mission requires a different application of [First Amendment] 
protections.”229 In other words, “within the military community there is 
simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian 
community.”230 This lack of autonomy is justified because the armed 
forces rely on discipline and duty within the ranks,231 this discipline 
allows them to effectively fight the nation’s wars,232 and either the 
Constitution or institutional competencies demand that the political 
branches—not the courts—should make judgments about how best to 
regulate the armed forces.233  
The Court’s reliance on these rationales when reviewing 
constraints on military personnel has arguably created a “military 
deference doctrine.”234 When applying this doctrine, the Court may 
generate an entirely separate, more tolerant standard than it would 
normally apply, or it may apply the relevant civilian standard but 
“stack the deck” by emphasizing the importance of the government 
interests involved or giving significant weight to the government’s view 
of the appropriateness of the means chosen.235 
For example, in Brown v. Glines, the Supreme Court upheld an 
Air Force regulation that required airmen to get prior approval before 
circulating petitions on base.236 The Court found that the regulation 
 
 227. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (balancing efficiency, workplace 
harmony, and the proper performance of an employee’s duties against the employee’s First 
Amendment rights).  
 228. See generally John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference 
Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000) (describing three eras of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
deferring to the military on constitutional questions). But see Pinson, supra note 144, at 848–54, 
861–65 (describing rationales for the Supreme Court’s military deference cases and arguing that 
none of them justify upholding restrictions on former servicemembers as candidates). 
 229. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 758 (1974). 
 230. Id. at 751. 
 231. See id. at 744, 759 (noting that there are “certain overriding demands of discipline and 
duty” and that “[s]peech that is protected in the civil population may . . . undermine the 
effectiveness of response to command” (citations omitted)); Pinson, supra note 144, at 850. 
 232. See, e.g., Parker, 417 U.S. at 743 (explaining that a separate military society is required 
because “it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should 
the occasion arise” (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955))). 
 233. See O’Connor, supra note 228, at 174–80, 259, 265 (describing cases utilizing these 
justifications); Pinson, supra note 144, at 850–51 (summarizing rationales for the military 
deference doctrine). 
 234. See, e.g., Pinson, supra note 144, at 848–54 (outlining the doctrine). 
 235. See id. at 852–53 (describing these two methods). 
 236. 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980). 
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“protect[ed] a substantial Government interest unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression,” specifically, the military’s interest in 
discipline and command authority, which are “prerequisites for military 
effectiveness.”237 And in the earlier case of Greer v. Spock, the Court 
even demonstrated a willingness to defer to restrictions on the political 
speech of nonservicemembers if that speech would affect military 
duties.238 Fort Dix regulations (in concert with an army regulation) 
prohibited political demonstrations and speeches as well as the 
distribution of publications on base without prior approval if such 
publications posed “a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale 
of [the] troops.”239 The Court upheld the installation commander’s 
decision to prohibit several candidates from holding events and his 
decision to evict civilians who distributed campaign literature without 
prior permission.240 It ended its opinion with strong language about the 
“American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military 
establishment under civilian control,” linking this to the observation 
that “the military as such is insulated from both the reality and the 
appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political  
causes or candidates.”241  
Greer and Brown obviously implicate the use of government 
facilities and platforms, a factor not directly present in the retiree 
endorsement context. But they demonstrate the Court’s willingness to 
adopt a more flexible approach to safeguard military effectiveness and 
civilian control—even when the speech involved is core political speech 
by those not on active duty. As previously discussed, deterring retired 
flag officer endorsements would help shore up civilian control and 
promote military effectiveness.242 It would increase the odds of civilian 
leadership deferring to genuine professional expertise, reinforce trust 
in the chain of command, and encourage a larger cross-section of the 
population to volunteer for military service.243 
Unlike the regulations in Greer and Brown or the criminal 
provisions in Parker, however, this Note does not advocate a direct 
prohibition or penalty. The next Sections will outline several potential 
 
 237. Id. at 354. 
 238. 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976); see also O’Connor, supra note 228, at 247–48 (observing that 
Greer “extended the military deference doctrine” by deferring to policies of the executive branch—
previously, it had only deferred to congressional statutes—and by deferring “to the regulation of 
military installations, even if those regulations may apply to civilians aboard such installations”). 
 239. Greer, 424 U.S. at 831 & n.2, 832–33 (quoting Fort Dix Reg. 210-26 (1968), Fort Dix Reg. 
210-27 (1997), and Army Reg. 210-20, 5-5(c) (1970)). 
 240. Id. at 840. 
 241. Id. at 839. 
 242. See supra Section I.B. 
 243. See id. 
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indirect remedies, predict their efficacy, and offer a preliminary look at 
how military deference could interact with the applicable First 
Amendment standards should a retired flag officer bring a challenge in 
court. 
B. Formalized Ostracism 
Besides hoping for a stronger social taboo against endorsement, 
political scientists Golby, Dropp, and Feaver suggest an indirect 
enforcement mechanism: the service components could blacklist those 
in violation of the taboo and block them from participating in “briefings, 
mentoring assignments and other consulting opportunities” with the 
active force.244 The authors argue that eventually, fear of this 
formalized ostracism would deter potential endorsers.245 Certainly, 
senior leaders that have retired from the military continue to maintain 
strong relationships with those who remain on active duty, and 
threatening those relationships could make some potential endorsers 
think twice.  
Unfortunately, this policy on its own would not deter the bulk of 
retired flag officer endorsements. Effectively maintaining and enforcing 
a blacklist would be difficult, considering the wide array of formal and 
informal events hosted by units of every size. And even assuming 
endorsers could be effectively ostracized from interacting directly with 
active military units, other groups like think tanks, universities, and 
nongovernmental organizations would happily volunteer to host and 
engage with senior military leaders, giving endorsers and their 
supporters plenty of incentive to perpetuate the practice.  
On the plus side, this proposal would be relatively easy to justify 
legally, as long as it was applied evenhandedly.246 The military need not 
invite every retiree back to participate in these voluntary opportunities. 
And to the extent that military installations and resources are involved, 
Greer suggests that the services could prohibit participation by 
individuals whose prior partisan endorsements suggest they present 
the greatest risk of exposing active servicemembers to partisan 
speech.247 
 
 244. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 20. 
 245. Id.  
 246. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 838–39 (observing that the Fort Dix policy had been “objectively 
and evenhandedly applied,” with no candidates from “any political stripe” evading it). 
 247. See id. at 840 (upholding base regulations that prohibited political demonstrations and 
speeches as well as the distribution of publications on base without prior approval if such 
publications posed “a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of [the] troops.”). 
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C. Simultaneous Disclaimers and Restrictions on the  
Use of Military Titles 
A second potential approach would be for the DoD to update the 
Political Activity Directive to mandate that any time a retired flag 
officer makes a partisan endorsement (or causes a campaign or 
journalist to publish one), they must simultaneously provide a series of 
disclaimers, more strongly worded than those retiree-candidates must 
adhere to.248 For example, the disclaimer could read: 
This endorsement does not imply that my views are shared by the DoD, any of the 
individual services, or any active duty military personnel. The DoD strongly discourages 
partisan political endorsements by retired senior officers because it has determined that 
they degrade professional ethics, reduce military effectiveness, and are easily 
misinterpreted in ways that undermine the constitutional principle of civilian control. 
Such a disclaimer might deter some retired flag officers from endorsing, 
either because of the additional coordination required to include the 
language, or because the language itself might reduce the intended 
impact of the endorsement. For those that continue to endorse, the 
public might receive the information more skeptically. On the other 
hand, as soon as third parties pick up news of the endorsement, the 
disclaimer language will likely disappear from the public conversation. 
The same endorsers who already point to the professional taboo while 
justifying their actions could garner additional publicity by arguing 
that the stakes are so high that they simply had to speak out despite 
the disclaimers.  
Alternatively, or in combination with the disclaimer 
requirement, the DoD could add a provision in the directive prohibiting 
retired flag officers from utilizing their rank or former duty positions in 
connection with a partisan endorsement, in campaign literature, or at 
a campaign event.249 As previously discussed, existing ethics 
regulations already address retirees’ use of military titles in the context 
of employment and business dealings, prohibiting uses that “cast[ ] 
discredit on DoD” or “give[ ] the appearance of sponsorship, sanction, 
endorsement, or approval by DoD.”250 This proposal would simply 
 
 248. See discussion supra Section II.C.1. Typical candidate disclaimers today read: “Use of 
military rank does not imply endorsement by the Marine Corps, or the Department of Defense.” 
AMY MCGRATH, https://amymcgrath.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NF4D-
5VHV] (promoting the U.S. senate campaign of a retired marine corps lieutenant colonel). 
 249. This idea derives from a proposal by two retired army officers, who suggest that Congress 
might “create civilly enforceable restrictions specifically prohibiting retirees from using military 
titles in political settings.” Corbett & Davidson, supra note 48, at 70. 
 250. See JER, supra note 166, ¶ 2-304 (stipulating when retired military members “may use 
military titles in connection with commercial enterprises”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702(b) (2019) 
(explaining permissible usage of government positions and titles for employees of the executive 
branch).  
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import the restriction to the political context and make explicit that the 
use of rank and titles by retired individuals who have reached the 
highest levels of military leadership inevitably implies institutional 
endorsement.251 This proposal also shares an internal logic similar to 
the Hatch Act restriction on civil servants using “official authority or 
influence” to sway an election, which would include using an official 
title in connection with a campaign.252 The restriction hones in on 
proxies for the institutional credibility that endorsers and campaigns 
exploit. Removing these signals for why the endorsement should matter 
might make the practice less attractive to both campaigns and the 
retired officers themselves.  
Like the disclaimer requirement, however, a limit on the use of 
military titles could also be evaded. PACs and news outlets could do the 
investigative work and provide the public with rank and previous job 
title. And even if this proposal did reduce the use of military titles, it 
would not reduce the impact of endorsements by retired flag officers 
that have acquired significant name recognition.253 
Nonetheless, these proposals would put some indirect legal 
pressure on retired flag officers to think before they sign on to a 
campaign. In combination with formally ostracizing endorsers from 
military events, mentorship programs, and partnership opportunities, 
the approach could reduce the overall number and impact of 
endorsements and signal widespread institutional disapproval of the 
endorsement practice, providing additional ammunition to those who 
criticize endorsers for violating the professional taboo. 
As discussed previously, however, investigating and penalizing 
retirees for violations of the Political Activity Directive is typically not 
practicable, since they do not have a commander to implement 
administrative sanctions unless called back to active duty.254 Therefore, 
 
 251. See GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that flag rank makes an 
endorser “qualitatively different” from other officers because “it seems likely that the broader 
public would view his statements as ‘official’ even if he tried to claim they were his own private, 
personal views”); id. (observing that flag officers were the “clear targets” of presidential 
campaigns). 
 252. 5 C.F.R. § 734.302(a), (b)(1) (2019). 
 253. Cf. Paul D. Shinkman, 88 Generals, Admirals Pen Support for Trump, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Sept. 6, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-06/88-
generals-admirals-pen-support-for-trump-but-lack-name-recognition-of-clinton-supporters 
[https://perma.cc/LGB8-QJFC] (asserting that the retired admirals and generals supporting 
Trump “lack[ ] the kind of name-branding of the former military leaders who support Hillary 
Clinton” and that “[f]ew if any . . . have military experience that ma[ke] them household names”). 
 254. Cf. JER, supra note 250, ¶¶ 10-100, 10-200 (explaining that the UCMJ is the mechanism 
for sanctioning “current DoD employees” and mentioning specific statutes “that regulate the post-
Government service Federal employment activities of former or retired DoD employees” but not 
outlining a general administrative mechanism applicable to retirees). 
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to make a disclaimer requirement and title restriction more effective, 
Congress would have to give the OSC (or an entity within the DoD) clear 
authority to refer these types of cases to the U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board to conduct informal adjudications with the ability to 
impose civil penalties like fines.255 The Board already adjudicates 
certain appeals from DoD civilian employees,256 and it already hears 
Hatch Act cases,257 so its members would be able to draw on this 
experience in determining whether a retired flag officer’s speech met 
the chosen definition for “endorsement” and whether titles and 
disclaimers were or were not utilized properly. For first-time offenses, 
the investigating entity could send violators letters telling them to add 
disclaimers or remove titles. 
It is unclear how a reviewing court would evaluate a disclaimer 
requirement and a restriction on the use of titles. Neither specifically 
prohibits or penalizes the speech at issue, but a disclaimer like the one 
above compels individuals to host government speech in a potentially 
impermissible way,258 and both tools certainly put government pressure 
on speakers to avoid exercising their First Amendment rights. The 
Supreme Court sometimes finds this pressure problematic, such as 
when it held that a state commission could not identify “objectionable” 
books and write sellers discouraging their sale by tacitly threatening 
police or prosecutorial action.259 But other times, the Court takes a more 
lenient approach. In Meese v. Keene, the Court held that the government 
could identify foreign films as “political propaganda” and require 
exhibitors to project the label “political propaganda” prior to screening 
 
 255. This obviously assumes that the MSPB is staffed as intended, which has not been the 
case in recent years. See Nicole Orgrysko, Senate Forces ‘First’ for MSPB as the Agency Loses All 
Members, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 1, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/ 
workforce-rightsgovernance/2019/03/senate-forces-first-for-mspb-as-the-agency-loses-all-
members/ [https://perma.cc/QMD9-JAXK]. 
 256. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., DODI 1400.25, VOLUME 731, DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: SUITABILITY AND FITNESS ADJUDICATION FOR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ¶ 7 
(2012) (explaining that individuals applying for or serving in covered positions may appeal adverse 
decisions about their suitability to the MSPB). 
 257. Jurisdiction, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BOARD, https://www.mspb.gov/About/ 
jurisdiction.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J86R-H8J9]. 
 258.  Compare Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–65, 
70 (2006) (upholding a federal statute that required law schools to permit military recruiters, 
despite the schools’ contention that it forced them to project a lack of concern about “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell”), with Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995) (holding that parade organizers could not be forced to include groups with messages they 
did not desire to present). 
 259. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (holding that the Rhode Island 
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth violated the First Amendment when it identified 
“objectionable” books, wrote to sellers urging them not to stock these books, and informed sellers 
that the Commission provided local police a list of distributors and recommended obscenity 
prosecutions). 
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them.260 The Court found that the requirement “neither prohibits nor 
censors the dissemination of advocacy materials.”261 Rather, it simply 
mandated “additional disclosures that would better enable the public to 
evaluate the import of the propaganda.”262 Disclaimers on partisan 
endorsements by retired flag officers could be similarly justified. 
Especially if combined with general deference regarding military 
imperatives, these proposals would likely pass constitutional muster.  
D. A Contractual Promise 
The proposals in the previous Sections represent modest legal 
responses that the DoD could act on relatively easily. A more robust 
response merits some preliminary discussion: before military officers 
could apply for promotion to the flag officer rank, they would have to 
certify that should they be selected for promotion, they will refrain from 
endorsing any candidate for partisan office for eight years after 
retirement. I will call this “Wait for Eight.” A stricter version of this 
proposal would clarify in the contractual provision that should the 
retiree subsequently choose to endorse a candidate, she would face a 
monetary penalty, just as violators face damages for breach of contract 
in the civilian context. A contractual promise represents the best chance 
at effectively curbing the most dangerous retired flag officer 
endorsements but also raises the largest First Amendment concerns—
namely the specter of an “unconstitutional condition,” the contours of 
which this Section will briefly sketch.  
“Wait for Eight” would be more effective than disclaimers, title 
restrictions, and formalized ostracism. Evading a specific contractual 
prohibition through the use of third parties, though conceivable, would 
require more creativity263 and would not be worth the risk for most 
retirees, who could simply wait out the term and avoid risking a 
violation. Additionally, as the waiting period passes, the would-be 
endorser’s name recognition, association with recent national security 
issues, and connection to senior military and civilian leaders would 
fade, making a potential endorsement both less impactful and less 
likely to be solicited.264 For example, a waiting period of eight years 
 
 260. 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
 261. Id. at 478. 
 262. Id. at 480. 
 263. For example, retirees could band together and form an advocacy organization that 
endorses specific candidates. Or the spouses of retired flag officers could endorse candidates. A 
sufficiently nuanced definition of “endorsement” could likely preclude the former. The latter 
presents less of a danger of implied institutional endorsement. 
 264. Cf. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 18 (speculating that an endorsement from 
a four-star general like Stanley McCrystal, strongly associated with a specific conflict and 
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would ensure the completion of two presidential elections, meaning that 
those abiding by the promise could not endorse a president that they 
served for in uniform, or even anyone running against a president that 
they served for in uniform.265 These characteristics popularize an 
endorsement and enflame its damaging effects.266 In this way, a 
contractual waiting period deters the most dangerous endorsements 
and incorporates a logic similar to that of the secretary of defense 
waiting period and the “cooling off” period in the business ethics 
context. Creating a decision point for servicemembers at the cusp of 
taking flag officer rank could also formalize an additional distinction 
between these officers and those of lower rank, encouraging officers at 
the threshold to recognize that their actions will carry an increased risk 
of implying institutional endorsement.  
Could a contractual postemployment waiting period survive 
judicial review? Perhaps. Generally, the government cannot provide a 
benefit on the condition that an individual forgo her constitutional 
rights.267 Opponents would argue that the proposal represents a penalty 
coercing individuals to forgo promotion or else give up their full right to 
political speech after retirement. Should civil penalties be enforced, 
these could also generate a coercive juncture: a retired flag officer would 
have to decide if endorsing in spite of the contractual promise was worth 
losing some of her pension.  
A reviewing court adopting this frame would likely treat the 
scheme like any other content-based restriction on speech and apply 
strict scrutiny, placing the burden on the government to establish that 
it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.268 The 
 
presidential administration, would have a larger impact than one from four-star general John 
Nathman); Bayne, supra note 48, at 42–43 (arguing that the prominence of an endorsement 
depends on rank, public profile, frequency of the endorser’s previous interaction with the 
president, proximity to last date of active service, and existing public perception of partisanship). 
 265. Presidents may only serve two four-year terms. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. No matter 
when in the cycle an officer retires, two presidential elections will occur during the eight-year 
waiting period. Any elections involving an incumbent that the officer could have served under 
would therefore occur during this period. 
 266. For example, the proposal would discourage selection of senior officers based on 
partisanship because administrations would assess less risk to a reelection campaign. Trust and 
inclusion in decisionmaking would likewise improve if such a fear was addressed. Finally, those 
that speak out after eight years of being away from the active service will more conspicuously be 
posturing themselves as personally partisan, instead of pretending that they are continuing with 
their duties. 
 267. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (holding 
unconstitutional a statutory prohibition against using Legal Services Corporation funds on 
representation “involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system”); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (holding unconstitutional a California veterans’ property tax 
exemption that required applicants to subscribe to an oath that they would not advocate the 
overthrow of the government or advocate for a foreign state against the United States). 
 268. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
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government could cite several compelling state interests necessary for 
civilian control of the military that are analogous to those justifying 
restrictions on the political activities of civil servants269 and judges.270 
It could argue that the scheme is narrowly tailored because it targets 
the most dangerous population of military endorsers and would only 
last for the amount of time in which the endorsements would be the 
most damaging. The military deference doctrine might even help “stack 
the deck.”271 Ultimately, however, the government would face an uphill 
battle under this framework.  
On the other hand, a reviewing court might choose not to frame 
this as a coercive condition at all. Cases involving conditions on 
individual rights frequently produce inconsistent results, with perhaps 
the least amount of coherence in the subset of cases involving conditions 
on speech.272 On occasion, the Supreme Court has instead framed 
conditions on funding as “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
exercise” of the right.273 For example, in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation, it determined that the government’s decision not to tax 
contributions to nonprofits could be conditioned on the organization 
declining to use that money for “propaganda” or lobbying.274 Similarly, 
the Court determined that Congress could condition federal funding for 
family-planning services on providers’ compliance with regulations 
prohibiting abortion counseling and activities that “encourage, promote 
or advocate abortion.”275 Proponents for a contractual waiting period 
 
 269. For example, safeguarding public trust in the military’s nonpartisan nature. Cf. U.S. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 563–67 (1973) (identifying the 
selection of civil servants based on merit instead of political connections as a compelling state 
interest).  
 270. For example, ensuring that top military leaders are chosen based on their technical 
expertise, not their partisan sympathies. Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444–48 
(2015) (observing that even though elected judges may actually be able to avoid favoring donors 
whose donations they personally solicited, the perception of favorable treatment could erode public 
confidence in the judiciary’s ability to administer justice). 
 271. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (describing one way in which the Court might 
apply the doctrine). 
 272. See Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1995) (“Although some 
parts of the metadoctrine [of unconstitutional conditions] may be theoretically explicable . . . I 
think . . . that larger portions of the area, and particularly large portions of conditions on free 
speech, cannot be theoretically rationalized.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416–17 (1989) (listing holdings that appear to create inconsistencies). 
 273. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983); see also 
Sullivan, supra note 272, at 1440 (describing how defining baselines determines whether a 
program “penalizes” or “subsidizes”); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. 
L. REV. 593, 601–03 (1990) (observing that “generating the appropriate baselines from which to 
distinguish subsidies from penalties is exceptionally difficult”). 
 274. 461 U.S. at 542 n.1, 546–51. 
 275. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991). Medicaid may also decline to subsidize a 
medically necessary abortion despite funding all other medically necessary pregnancy-related 
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could argue that Congress similarly has the authority to promote 
individuals—paying them and bestowing them with the institutional 
weight and visibility of “general” or “admiral”—based in part on an 
assurance that these endowments will not be used in the future to 
degrade the military’s nonpartisan nature.276  
It may simply be too much of a stretch to label present-day 
employment at higher rank (or a retirement pension at a specified level) 
a “subsidy” for postemployment political speech.277 Proponents could 
potentially distinguish the proposal by its nature as an employment 
contract. While the contours of the contractual provision would need to 
be outlined by Congress,278 fashioning the waiting period as a 
contractual promise instead of a statutory prohibition makes it more 
like postemployment restrictive covenants in the private sector, such as 
noncompete agreements, nonsolicitation agreements, and 
confidentiality provisions. It could also be analogized to exclusivity 
arrangements in product endorsement contracts signed by celebrities. 
All of these curtail speech and activities that would otherwise be 
permissible in order to protect legitimate business interests.279 
Similarly, a contractual promise would curtail the otherwise 
permissible speech of retired flag officers in order to protect the 
government’s compelling interest in a nonpartisan military.  
Ultimately, while an argument can be made to support a 
contractual promise, its novelty and uncertain relationship to the 
Court’s constitutional-condition cases suggest that it should be pursued 
only as a last resort. 
 
costs. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–26 (1980); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474–75 
(1977) (reasoning that a Connecticut regulation restricting funding for nontherapeutic abortions 
did not represent “state interference with a protected activity” but rather “state encouragement of 
an alternative activity” such as bringing pregnancies to term). 
 276. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of 
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 1002–03 (1995) (observing that the more 
senior the public official, the less likely we are to object to her dismissal for criticizing the 
president). 
 277. The Court’s recent emphasis on examining the “scope” of the federal program and 
whether the condition defines limits outside of this scope could also be problematic. See Agency for 
Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214–17 (2013) (“[T]he relevant distinction 
that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the limits of the government 
spending program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions 
that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”). 
 278. This would represent a significant change to the military’s promotion and personnel 
management system and attempting to enact it at the agency level would be inappropriate, 
especially considering Congress’s more involved role in the selection of flag officers. For example, 
Congress authorizes the exact number of flag officers, as opposed to specifying percentages like it 
does for other ranks. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 525, 526, 12004, 12005 (2012). 
 279. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing the 
relationship between promises not to compete and “the promisee’s legitimate interest”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States requires a nonpartisan military, one subject 
to robust civilian control. The practice of retired flag officers endorsing 
political candidates appears to be worsening, and it represents a clear 
danger to civilian control. It also weakens military effectiveness. 
Retirees remain subject to military jurisdiction because they earn a 
pension and may be subject to recall. But the existing array of statutory 
and regulatory restrictions on political activity cannot adequately 
address the endorsement problem. To date, most commentators have 
suggested that shoring up professional norms represents the only 
palatable solution. Unfortunately, professional norms have failed to 
contain the growth of the practice.  
Congress has historically found it necessary to enact legal 
constraints on servicemembers—and retirees—when facing novel 
threats to civilian control. And in other contexts—such as judicial 
ethics, the Hatch Act, and business ethics for military retirees—
restrictions on endorsement speech have been justified by similar state 
interests. As a first step, the DoD should consider restricting retired 
flag officers who make partisan endorsements from partnership 
opportunities with the active force. It should also consider creating a 
strong disclaimer requirement for endorsers and expanding existing 
restrictions on the use of military rank and titles to prohibit their use 
in connection with a partisan endorsement. If these proposals fail to 
diminish the growing trend, Congress should consider modifying 
employment provisions so that those who take flag officer rank agree to 
refrain from endorsing for some time after retiring. Certainly, the 
partisan behavior of retired flag officers is only one element of a 
complicated civil-military relationship. But it serves as a reminder that 
while civilian control may be a fundamental constitutional principle, it 
relies on measures beyond the Constitution to manifest and protect it. 
Hannah Martins Miller* 
 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2020, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., 2013, Princeton 
University. Thank you to all of my Vanderbilt Law Review teammates for epitomizing 
professionalism and enriching the last two years of my life beyond belief. Thank you also to my 
professors, including Rachel Anderson-Watts, Timothy Meyer, Michael Newton, Ganesh 
Sitaraman, and Ingrid Wuerth. And of course, thank you to my husband and family—always. The 
views expressed in this Note are mine alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 
U.S. Army, DoD, or the U.S. government.    
